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Foreword
In ever increasingly competitive and challenging environments concerning the tourism industry
worldwide, Game Theory is called upon to study scenarios of conflict and cooperation to help
determine the most likely outcomes of tourism players striving to maximize their positions. Prof.
Jean Tavares´ latest manuscript ´Game Theory – Applied to Tourism´ provides a solid theoretical
backdrop supported by the practical application of a variety of case studies. In a simplified and
reader-friendly manner, the book takes the reader through the depths of this fascinating field of
study making it accessible and enjoyable.
Prof. Tavares´ extensive experience and publications on Game Theory combined with his
knowledge and passion for the tourism industry are reflected in the array of the easy-to-understand
examples offered in this book. Prof. Tavares´ book provides the most current and highly valuable
resource for both novice and most seasoned readers interested in the topic.
Prof. Giancarlo Fedeli, PhD
Professor Department of Business
IMC University of Applied Sciences Krems (IMC Fachhochschule Krems), Austria
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Game Theory
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Game Theory
Key Terms
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Game theory
Strategic interdependence
Players and rules
Results and payoffs
Actions and strategies
Verification mechanisms
Signaling strategies
Complete and incomplete information
Perfect and imperfect information

The term game, when it is generally related to sports and leisure, is certainly not strange to most
people. However, this term can be associated with other situations, thus obtaining huge importance
as a tool for the strategic analysis of businesses and companies. This significance is because the
interactive and competitive elements that are present in each game characterize the need to
consider the attitude of the other players so that anyone involved can achieve success.
A company must be aware of its internal environment — such as restructuring departments,
establishing missions and objectives, as well as reducing costs, among others — while at the same
time, observing the strategies of its competitors. In other words, they must worry about who else
will compete in their market.
Sadly, this has not always happened in companies, as they are much more concerned with looking
inside than looking outside of their internal environment. In these circumstances, the familiar
question may arise: If we did everything according to the plan, why did we fail? The answer may
lie with another competitor! Thus, the results (profits, revenues, market position, and so forth)
depend not only on the actions of the companies themselves but also on the actions of their
competitors. The high evidence that these companies interact in an environment of strategic
interdependence can be seen in the two examples below.
First, consider a very usual situation in the hospitality industry. A famous theme park in Paris,
France, intends to launch new attractions that promise to revolutionize the sector. In this case,
would it be better for another theme park to create new attractions, or to dedicate its efforts to
diversify its entertainment portfolios, such as bowling alleys, cinemas, or aquariums? It then
becomes evident that the success of these companies will be influenced by the actions that each
one takes in the implementation of their strategies.
The other example refers to a common situation in the air transport sector, as seen in almost any
area anywhere in the world. This state of affairs relates to the pricing policy that is established by
a company new to the market and the reaction of the remaining companies. The new company can
choose to set its prices at the same level as the established airlines or prefer to set a lower value
than those charged by their competitors. On the other hand, the older-established companies may
react to the new company’s pricing policy by setting even lower prices, or they may be able to
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accommodate themselves, by not triggering a price battle in the sector. Therefore, depending on
its size, the pricing policy of the new company might, or might not, trigger a chain reaction from
the other established airlines.
1.1. The Failures of the Main Methods of Approach Concerning a Company’s Strategies
Despite various circumstances demonstrating that interaction between companies occurs, the
economic theory fails when it sees the firm as a productive unit, which transforms inputs into
products. There are numerous different processes to be adopted to achieve this aim. The idea that
the traditional approach, as used by economists relating to agents, is only partial in its analysis,
and this can be corroborated by Gremaud and Braga (1991, p.11):
In traditional Microeconomics, the agent decides based on a set of information, in a so-called parametric
environment, that is, an environment in which the result depends only on the agent’s decision, regardless of
the actions of other agents.

It is not enough to say, for example, that company X maximizes its profit at the point where the
marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost. It is still necessary to show how to reach this point
and to analyze the competitor’s actions of importance, who acts precisely in the sense of negating
the success of company X.
A company can be defined in a very simple way as an organization with a set of resources, while
at the same time, seeking to achieve specific goals. However, as mentioned above, it is necessary
to observe the behavior of its competitors, as they too have their purposes, which often are mutually
exclusive – notably, the occurrence of one prevents the occurrence of the other.
The excessive emphasis on case studies also contributes to an incomplete analysis of the
companies’ decision-making process. There are three reasons for choosing to avoid only case
studies:
• A strategy can be beneficial for one company and not work for other companies.
• It would be necessary to analyze a considerable number of case studies, to try to cover all
of the possibilities in the business world, and to obtain a manual for decision making.
• It is necessary to have a consistent and comprehensive decision analysis tool that can
explain, in general, and not company by company, the relationship between business
decisions and their results.
Consequently, the main means of approach concerning the companies’ strategies presents blind
spots in explaining how the company works about its strategic behavior. A new field of strategic
interactions between the most diverse agents then emerges, namely, Game Theory.
1.2. Game Theory: Origin and Evolution
Although its main foundations were set in the last century, the history of Game Theory dates back
to very ancient times. According to an article published by Walker (1985), the first examples of
Game Theory were found in the Talmud (the basic code of civil and canon law of post-biblical
Judaism). This was mainly where there were rules for the distribution of inheritance among the
wives after the husband’s death, being understood later, as an anticipation of the modern theory of
cooperative games.
3
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In Walker’s article, a solution that was determined by James Waldegrave in 1913 was for a type
of card game that was typical in his time, which came to be understood as the first minimax
combined equilibrium strategy (although it did not extend its results for other games). A minimax
strategy minimizes the player’s losses or maximizes his/her gains.
200 years after the solution that was found by Waldegrave, Zermelo (1913), a German
mathematician, analyzed the application of combined strategies in a well-known chess game and
established the first theorem of Game Theory, the well-known Zermelo’s theorem. He, in turn,
claimed that chess had only an individually rational result in pure strategies.
In 1921, the French mathematician Émile Borel (the first to define strategy games) published some
texts on two-player games, with three or five strategies. Félix Édouard Justin Émile Borel died in
1956 in Paris, France. He received the first gold medal from Le Centre National de la Recherché
Scientifique in 1955. The existence of common characteristics that were presented by some types
of games was verified by the mathematician Steinhaus in 1925, who then elaborated another
contribution to the resolution of games through minimax strategies. Other contributions by
Steinhaus were mentioned by Passos and Nakabashi (2002, p.7):
By formulating a new way of playing, where the participants knew all of the possible consequences of each
move, as well as the best responses to them, Steinhaus made it possible for John von Neumann to prove the
minimax theorem in the article Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele (1928) on the theory of social games,
establishing that every zero-sum game, with two participants and with many but pure finite strategies for
each player is determined. When combined strategies are allowed, this type of game has exactly an
individual rational outcome. For this test, he used quantitative methods that were advanced for the time,
going down in history as the genesis of Game Theory.

Born in 1903 in Budapest to a family of Jewish bankers, von Neumann is considered one of the
most brilliant mathematicians, having made contributions in several areas of knowledge. In 1944,
the most significant contribution to the development of Game Theory so far appeared in the book
named ‘The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior’ by John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern. In this work, the authors elaborated on a theory (highly formal and with rigorous
scientific treatment) that applied to games with three or more players, stating that economic logic
behaves according to the interaction of its agents since this interaction guides the taking of the
agent’s decisions and strategies.
In May 1948, the American government created Project RAND (which would become the RAND
Corporation), a non-profit institution dedicated to scientific, educational, and mainly, the security
promotion of the United States, by using linear programming and the theory of games. The
importance given by American authorities to Game Theory was mentioned by Passos and
Nakabashi (2002, p.9):
The high level of researchers and the substantial government investment that was made in this project have
made it synonymous with Game Theory research. This condition was reinforced by publishing the
collective work of the Mathematical Theory of Zero-Sum Two-Person Games with a Finite Number or a
Continuum of Strategies (1948). This work presented advanced matrix methods that allowed for the
resolution of infinite games.

A decisive discovery for the advancement of Game Theory was made by Nash (1951), proving the
existence of an equilibrium strategy for all games, with n participants, called Nash Equilibrium. In
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1965, Reinhard Selten perfected the Nash Balance concept through the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium. However, the action of Nash’s Equilibrium in games of incomplete information was
only possible through the works of Harsanyi, which were published in the late 1960s. With the
results of Nash-Harsanyi, the expansion of Game Theory use in many areas was inevitable, from
economics to biology. In Incomplete Information Games, the payoff functions are not common
knowledge of the players involved. In the early 1970s, Evolutionary Game Theory began to
develop from the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, as introduced by John Maynard Smith
in 1972.
In 1994, the importance of Game Theory was definitively consolidated in academia. John Nash,
John Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten were awarded the Nobel Prize for their contributions to
Economic Theory and Game Theory. In 2005, it was Game Theory that gave the Nobel Prize in
Economics to the American Schelling and the Israeli Aumann, who said, “Game Theory gives rise
to ideas that are important when addressing and solving problems in general” (Haaretz, 2005, p.
2).
1.3. The Market and Game Theory
The market offers countless situations in which it becomes possible to verify the importance of the
strategic behavior for companies, as we will see in the three examples that follow. First, for
example, suppose that a restaurant is installed on a bustling avenue in a city. Next to this restaurant,
there is an available property, where a sizeable professional outplacement agency is established.
This information was not public knowledge when the steakhouse was first installed. As it is
common to form huge lines at the entrance of employment agencies, the turmoil environment in
the vicinity could be unpleasant for customers of the steakhouse, who could move to a direct
competitor.
In a second case, imagine a company that specializes in selling personalized travel bags and that
sets a goal of being the market leader in more than five years. Will other competitors accept the
achievement of this goal without reaction? What would happen if they proposed the same purpose
for themselves?
Finally, consider a booking company that surveys the field to assess the possibilities for success
in launching a new product. The responses from the target audience indicate that the product has
a high chance of being a success. However, once again, it is necessary to consider the competitors’
actions. Can they imitate the new product and make a quick launch, just under another name? Will
the booking company have the intended desire to even fight back against its competitor?
Situations like these are common in any market, and all of them involve the actions that are
implemented by a company and the possible reactions of the competing firms. Accordingly, it
must be made clear that not recognizing that the company lives in a scenario of strategic
interdependence, implies that they have a wrong view of reality, which in general, causes
irreparable damage to many organizations. To analyze the strategies of companies in situations
inherent to their daily work and actions, an efficient tool of economic analysis is sought, called
strategy games, which receive a formal treatment given by Game Theory.

5

University of South Florida M3 Center Publishing

1.4. Game Theory: Definition
Game theory can be defined as the mathematical analysis of any situation that involves a conflict
of interest, to indicate the optimal choices that under given circumstances, will lead to the desired
result. In this sense, it is possible to state that in situations where two or more agents interact in an
environment of strategic interdependence, to achieve specific goals, the characterization of a
strategy game and the applicability of Game Theory are both present.
In turn, according to Radzvilas (2016, p. 14), a game (within this context) is “a formal
representation of a certain type of interdependent decision problem”. Naturally then, the result of
each action will also depend on the actions of the other players involved.
1.4.1. The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Game Theory uses a very famous example by mathematician Albert W. Tucker called the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, to show that even individuals when doing what is best for them, can still
collectively arrive at a result that is not best for them. The Prisoners’ Dilemma will be applied in
this book, with adaptations. The competitors will not be prisoners; they will be currency exchange
house owners. The reason for the arrest will no longer be the investigation of theft but the possible
formation of a cartel in the sector in which they operate. The situation from now on will be called
the entrepreneurs’ dilemma, which consists of summoning two entrepreneurs from a particular
sector by the competent Inspection Authority, to verify allegations that the two were organizing
and leading the formation of a cartel. The managers, who we will call ‘the players’, are in separate
and incommunicado rooms, and the proposal made to them is the following. If both confess their
intention to form a cartel, they will be imprisoned for three years. If they do not confess, the jail
time would be just one year. If only one of the entrepreneurs confesses, he will go free (as a reward
for his sincerity). The one who does not confess will be imprisoned for five years (making the
cartel difficult).
1.5. The Game’s Structure: The Main Information
A game must have the following information:
• The players.
• The rules (everything that the competitors can do, with their level of information)
• The payoffs (also called the earnings matrix; this reflects the consequences of the
competitors’ actions).
Information Level – How much does the player know in terms of whether the game is simultaneous
or not? Does he know the competitor’s payoffs, the consequences of each competitor’s action, and
importantly, what happens next?
1.5.1. The Players
An excellent definition of the players can be found in Gremaud and Braga (1988, p.15):
Players are economic agents, who make decisions, and they may be represented by consumers seeking to
maximize their satisfaction, companies seeking to maximize their profits or to increase their market share,
investors who must decide whether to take out a loan or not, banks who must decide whether they grant
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loans, or even if the government must decide to implement a specific economic policy. These players are,
in principle, considered rational and have preferences regarding the game’s results.

It is understood that the players can choose their actions, to obtain the greatest advantage for
themselves by this definition. However, when there is only one player, it is said that the game is
against Nature (which has, for example, no interest in maximizing profits or competing). An
example of Nature’s performance can be seen in civil aviation. The airline company’s revenues
may depend on the weather conditions, which are determined by chance. As a result, the airline
should build on its past experiences, or commission a survey of weather conditions from a
competent institution, and then use the information to assign a probability for the event’s
occurrence. In this case, the other player is Nature, whose action will influence the results that can
be obtained by the airline. Nature can also be the future demand for some products, such as a
pandemic, the evolution of social indicators, unemployment, or the simple result of a football
match.
1.5.2. The Rules
The rules of a game delimit the actions that the players can take. The set of rules for a given game
is characterized by specifying each of the following information:
• the list of players (competitors)
• the hypothesis that each player seeks to maximize their interests rationally
• all possible actions of each player
• each player’s earnings for all of the strategies that can be implemented
The norms of the entrepreneurs’ dilemma are:
• the two entrepreneurs are in separate rooms and cannot communicate
• each of them must make a choice, to confess or not
• the choice of one is only known to the other after the end of the interrogation
• the time in prison and the possibility of freedom are known to the entrepreneurs, who are
considered rational in their actions.
Each player has a set of strategies that are put into practice during the game, which has
consequences for each of them. This will lead to certain results, which can be expressed or
represented by the earnings (payoffs).
In the entrepreneurs’ dilemma, the possible results are:
• If they both confess, they are imprisoned for a certain period.
• If one entrepreneur confesses and the other does not, the first one goes free, and the one,
who did not confess, is imprisoned.
• If they both do not confess, they are in jail for a certain period of time.
1.5.3. Payoffs
Payoffs are the mathematical expression of the results that are achieved by the players’ actions.
Another payoffs definition was made by Dixit and Skeath (1999):
Each player is given a full numerical scale with which he compares all of the game’s results in a logical
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manner (...). The number associated with each possible outcome is called the player’s payoff for that
outcome. Larger numbers of payoffs are related to the results that are better within the player’s rating
system.

According to the evaluation system in the entrepreneurs’ dilemma, the fewer years in jail, the
better. If they both confess, they will be imprisoned (result) for three years (payoff). On the other
hand, if both of the entrepreneurs do not confess, they will be imprisoned in the same way (result),
and the jail time will only be for one year (payoff). If one of them confesses and the other does
not, the first will be released (one of the results), leaving the one who did not confess to serve a
sentence (result) of five years (payoff). Although the results and the payoffs related to them are
not always put simply, the payoffs obtained by the companies (which in this book, in general, are
the players) can mean the same or different variables for each of the players involved. For example:
• If two players rent a car, the companies can choose a specific strategy for launching a
particular modality, so both players will have an increase in their sales (result), each
obtaining a payoff of two hundred thousand new customers.
• If the negotiations on service fees between the crew recruiting companies and the
shipping companies are successful for both players, they will be able to increase their
companies’ revenue.
At the beginning of Game Theory courses, the students usually express their concern about how
to define reliable payoffs. In real life, this problem can be solved through market research, the
forecasting of techniques using econometrics, past experiences using similar strategies, the
company’s definition of earnings and goals, or simply by the entrepreneur’s intuition.
Econometrics Econometrics is a quantitative analysis method that results from economic theory,
statistics, and computer science, which seeks to explain the reality of facts. Payoffs can represent
the new customers that can be reached, an increased sales volume or market share, reduced costs,
increased profits, higher customer satisfaction levels, or a variety of other gains.
1.5.3.1. The Available Knowledge Levels
The knowledge that is available to the players plays a crucial role in Game Theory. In perfect
information games, the player is aware of the moves taken by his opponent; as a consequence, the
player knows the entire back history of the game. In imperfect information games, the player
knows the strategies that are available to his/her opponents but does not have complete knowledge
of which strategies they used. In full information games, all of the players involved in the dispute
know the payoffs that can be obtained by all of the other players.
It may seem unrealistic for a company to know perfectly what its competitor will achieve by its
payoff. However, currently, the flow and exchange of information are almost instantaneous. Even
information has a cost to be obtained, making it easier to quickly know the payoff of the
competitors.
It is common for a firm to know how much its competitor profits are from selling a product for a
specific price. Let us look at a typical situation: most airlines in a country have the same fuel
supplier, pay the same airport taxes, know the prices of the tickets that are sold by each of them,
and most likely, the earnings that are paid to the crew. Under these circumstances, knowledge is
possible because of the availability of market information.
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In Istanbul, the capital of Turkey, there is a market called the Grand Bazaar. It is one of the city’s
‘happening’ centers. In the market, the sellers are very communicative and emphatic, and this
promotes much interaction with the buyers. For example, a salesperson argues with another to
dispute the same customer, which constitutes the purest normality.
In this market, the attitudes of a seller usually have consequences on the sales of others, who in
turn, are always prepared to react. All of the examples seen above contribute to the idea that
payoffs can be common knowledge when involving a price issue. Even so, it is known that payoffs
are not always common knowledge, be they hidden as a matter of strategy. In short, there are
situations in which omitting information can bring positive results for a company. Nevertheless, if
the players are rational and each one knows that the other is rational, they will be fully aware of
when their opponent is telling the truth or just bluffing. So in this case, it would not be acceptable
for a company to say that it will do or will not do something because concrete evidence allows the
opponent to have no doubts about the true intention.
The actions taken by the most informed company are called signals, and the strategies resulting
from these actions (signs) are called signaling strategies. However, a less informed company can
create situations in which the more informed company is obliged to act and show the credibility
of its information. Such strategies are called verification or verification strategies, and how the
company uses them is called the verification mechanism.
An example that distinguishes the concepts of verification and signaling is seen in the next case.
A car rental company requires a customer with little driving experience to make an advanced
deposit of $1,000, to take care of any damages to the rental car. The customer refuses, and the firm
realizes that this operation is unfeasible in terms of risk. It can be seen from this situation that the
rental company has used a mechanism to verify the customer’s confidence, by querying or
questioning the customer’s abilities. On the other hand, if the customer had paid this value, that
would have been a sign of his/her confidence in returning the car in a good condition.
1.6. Actions, Strategies, and Operational Efficiency
As stated previously, in a game, the actions that the players can perform must be specified. A
player’s action manifests his/her will in real terms. That is, it is an attitude, such as cooperating or
not with his/her opponent, making agreements or making war, reacting to or accommodating a
threat, among other alternatives. Regarding agreements and cooperation, Game Theory can be
classified into cooperative games, being those in which deals are allowed, and non-cooperative
games, in which deals are impossible. Since a game can be composed of several actions, there is a
need to define the concept of strategy that is applied to Game Theory, which can take several
versions:
• Strategy is a complete contingent plan or decision rule that specifies how the player will
act in all possible circumstances that he or she may face.
• Strategy is the set of actions to be performed throughout the game, in response to the
opponent’s actions.
• Strategy is a pre-determined game program, which says what actions should be taken in
response to every possible strategy that the others may use.
On the importance of adopting strategies, Porter (2001) stated that the company, without a strategy,
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tries everything. Cost reduction, for example, is not a strategy but a measure to achieve operational
efficiency, an imperative necessity in the business world. In turn, the possible means to achieve a
greater market share, and the delimitation of actions to be undertaken when considering the
reaction of competitors to each implemented measure, fall under the concept of strategy.
It should be noted that the strategy does not change; it is a pattern; hence, it must be continued
rather than changed after every action. The strategies that have been used as examples in this book
have not gone through any formulation stage but only through implementation paths, which is
when they materialize. Inevitably, any learning process is disregarded over time but considered as
the possibility of total control of the situation, regardless of the competitor’s reactions.
After conceptualizing games, actions, strategies, and operational efficiency, it can now be defined
that strategy games are disputes in which the players, interacting in an environment of
interdependence, must act with a strategy in mind, to be put into practice for each answer given by
the other players.
Strategy games Disputes in which the players, interacting in an environment of interdependence,
must act when considering a strategy to be put into practice for each answer given by the other
players. In the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma, each of them is being questioned in a separate room. What
would be the strategies of each entrepreneur? To confess or not to confess. What would be the
possible action for each player (entrepreneur)? If the strategy is to confess, the entrepreneur will
have only one action: to tell the truth. Likewise, if the strategy is not to confess, the entrepreneur
will again have only one action: not telling the truth. Because of this, each entrepreneur has for
each of his/her strategies, only one action to be implemented.
An example inherent to the business environment can be used to identify the actions and the
strategies of the players. Let us suppose that two hotel chains are disputing the hiring of a renowned
executive in the market, and the difference comes down to the salary. Each of these companies has
four strategies: a) offer a high salary; b) offer a very high salary; c) offer a low salary; and d) offer
a meager salary. Each strategy in this game is made up of one action: offering a salary. Even if one
of the players chooses first, the number of strategies left to the other company remains the same.
1.7. Evolutionary Game Theory
It is possible to find situations in which two companies or two people who interact, end up
obtaining, among the possible results existing in the game, the one that is not the best one for both
of them. It is common for this to happen in disputes for new markets, with companies competing
via prices. This is the worst form of competition that exists from an entrepreneur’s point of view or for tourist destinations that dispute the installation of a large entertainment center, with
successive fiscal concessions that can reduce the well-being of the local population in some cases.
Moreover, it can be noticed that certain rational decisions of an individual, or a company, can
result in collective irrationality. Thus, to maximize their gains, the players incur attitudes that do
not lead to the best results that they could achieve, which is one of the situations that is analyzed
by Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Game Theory assumes that the players establish a game
program that enables them to achieve optimal results, while competitors also try to develop similar
plans. On the other hand, the EGT states that the players are formed by an infinite population, do
not have unlimited resources and knowledge about the environment in which they live, nor the

10
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/m3publishing/vol20/iss9781955833066/1
DOI: 10.5038/9781955833066

Tavares: Game theory – Applied to tourism

reasoning capacity that is capable of capturing and processing all of the current information. The
EGT differs from traditional Game Theory in that the latter uses a static theory, so reducing its
usefulness in analyzing various situations. The strategies associated with the best payoffs
predominate among agents, and those related to bad payoffs are no longer used. Therefore, when
a given strategy stands out and survives these interactions in a way that persists across a population,
it is called an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Summary
•
•

•
•
•

A company must be aware of its internal environment but it also needs to observe its
competitors’ strategies and their possible reactions. In other words, it needs to worry
about who else is going to compete in the market.
To analyze the interactions between the players and their strategies, strategy games can
be used, whose formal treatment is given by Game Theory, which aims to analyze the
problems in which there is an interaction between agents so that their actions affect and
are affected by the decisions of other agents or players.
The strategy in Game Theory is defined as the set of actions to be performed in response
to the opponents’ reactions. Among the strategies discussed, signaling and verification or
checking have been highlighted.
Games are classified as complete information games, incomplete information games,
perfect information games, and imperfect information games.
The elements of a game are the players, norms, consequences, and payoffs. The latter is a
quantitative expression of the implications of the strategies used.

Questions
1. Comment on the statement: a company should be aware of its internal environment.
2. What does it mean to say that companies live in a scenario of strategic interdependence?
3. What is the main purpose of Game Theory?
4. How important were John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern for Game Theory?
5. What is a game? Define and explain its essential elements.
6. A company can have Nature as an opponent. Explain and illustrate.
7. What can determine payoffs when dealing with companies?
8. Is it utopian to think that information about competitors is available? Explain.
9. Differentiate actions, strategies, and operational efficiency.
10. Give an example of a situation involving two companies in which both may use signaling
strategies and checking mechanisms.
11. Do you agree with the statement that every strategy, like every theory, is a simplification
that necessarily distorts reality; as a direct consequence, would it be an abstraction from
reality?
12. Conceptualize strategy games, complete information games, and incomplete information
games.

11

University of South Florida M3 Center Publishing

References
Dixit, Avinash, Skeath, Susan. Games of Strategy. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. 1999.
Gremaud, Amaury Patrick, Braga, Márcio Bobik. Teoria dos Jogos: uma introdução. In: PINHO, Diva Beneviste,
Vasconcelos, Marco Antônio Sandoval (Org.). Manual de Economia. 3ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 1998.
p.243-260.
Haaretz (2005). Israeli Winner of Nobel Prize: Israel Is No. 1 in Game Theory. https://www.haaretz.com/2005-1010/ty-article/israeli-winner-of-nobel-prize-israel-is-no-1-in-game-theory/0000017f-f733-d47e-a37fff3f24240000
Nash, John. (1951). Non-cooperative games. The Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), pp. 286-295.
Passos, Marcelo Oliveira; Nakabashi, Luciano. (2002). Universidade Federal do Paraná Programa de Pós-graduação
em Desenvolvimento Econômico (PPGDE). Evolução da teoria dos jogos e a sua incorporação pela teoria
neoclássica. Curitiba, PR: UFPR, 2002. 17 p. (Texto para discussão 1).
Porter, Michael. (2001). Arrume tempo para pensar. Revista Exame, 07 março.
Radzvilas, M. (2016). Strategic Interdependence, Hypothetical Bargaining, and Mutual Advantage in NonCooperative Games.
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3477/1/Radzvilas_Strategic_Interdependence.pdf
Walker, Paul. An Outline of the History of Game Theory. (1985). http://williamkiniz.www.drexel.edu/top/class/histf.html.
Zermelo, Ernest. (1913). Uber eine Anwendung der Mengdenlehre auf die theories ¨ des Schachspiels. Atas do
Décimo Quinto Congresso Internacional de Matemáticos, vol. 2, pp. 501–504, 1913.

12
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/m3publishing/vol20/iss9781955833066/1
DOI: 10.5038/9781955833066

Tavares: Game theory – Applied to tourism

Chapter 2: Complete Information Static
Games

13

University of South Florida M3 Center Publishing

Chapter 2: Complete Information Static Games
Key Terms
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Common knowledge
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
Iterated elimination of strategies that are never the best answer
Nash Equilibrium
Strictly dominant and dominated strategies
Mixed strategies
Normal or Strategic form
Inspection cell by cell
Static games

Complete Information Static Games are those in which, at the moment of making a choice, the
player does not know what choice his/her opponents are making but he/she knows ‘the possible
gains’ resulting from his/her choice. In addition to not knowing the opponent’s choices, the player
is also unaware of their payoffs (winning functions). This characterizes the game as one of
Incomplete Information. Note that not knowing in advance does not mean that the choices are
necessarily made simultaneously, just that the player does not know what the other is choosing.
For example, when two people are going to play odd or even for some advantage or prize, each
player does not know what the other will play exactly but he/she knows the gain or loss resulting
from the plays performed. The fact that one does not know precisely what the other is going to
play makes the game static. Knowing about the win or loss produces a Complete Information
Game.
Complete Information Static Games are represented in a Normal or Strategic form, in which each
player has a specified set of strategies and well-defined payoffs (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Complete Information Static Games

PLAYER 1
STRATEGIES

X
Y

PLAYER 2
STRATEGIES
X
Y
__;__
__;__
__;__
__;__

Player 1’s payoffs are on the left of each cell, and player 2’s are on the right. This rule will be used
throughout this book. It should be noted that the perfect understanding of each player’s payoffs in
the cell is of fundamental importance for the solution of games represented in a Normal or Strategic
form. Because of this, to reinforce the learning of static game representation and complete
information, the classic situation that is called the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma will be employed. Let
us review the case that was covered in Chapter 1, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, as adapted to a business
setting.
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2.1. Strategies and Payoffs
A government agency summoned two business people to testify about a possible formation in the
air transport sector. The owners of two airlines, which will be called players, are in separate and
incommunicado rooms, and the proposal made to them is as follows (Figure 2):
Figure 2. Normal or Strategic Form

ENTREPRENEUR 1

•
•

CON
NCO

ENTREPRENEUR 2
CON
NCO
-1;-1
-5;0
0;-5
-3;-3

If they both confess (CON) that they intend to form a cartel, they will be imprisoned for
three years.
If they do not confess (NCO), the prison term will only be one year.

2.2. Complete Full Information Static Game Resolution
According to Ornelas (1994, p. 15), “to solve a game means to determine which strategies rational
players would adopt in their environments, where the players’ rationality is common knowledge.”
There are several concepts of a solution or decision making, which will be analyzed below.
2.3. Dominant Strategies
The method of solving games through Dominant Strategies is not comprehensive (as it covers a
small number of games) but when they are present in a game, they are straightforward in being
identified. In a Static Game of Complete Information, one strategy is strictly dominant over the
other when the results obtained by using it are always better than the results that are obtained with
another strategy (to generate the greatest possible payoff for you), whatever the other players
choose for their strategy.
To check the existence of these strategies, observe whether, for each player, there is a choice that
always generates the highest possible payoff (and not necessarily the higher payoffs for the other
players), and this choice should be played (there will not be anything better to be executed). In the
Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma Game, each player has a dominant strategy: confession. For Entrepreneur
1, the strictly dominant strategy is to confess, as it leads to better results than the other strategy
(not confessing), no matter what Entrepreneur 2 does. Reason: if Entrepreneur 2 confesses, the
best answer that Entrepreneur 1 can give is to confess because if he does not do that, he will be
stuck alone for a longer time. If Entrepreneur 2 does not confess, the best response for Entrepreneur
1 is still to confess, as he will go free.
Similarly, the strictly dominant strategy for Entrepreneur 2 is to confess. Obtaining a bad result
would happen, even if the entrepreneurs could communicate and establish some agreement not to
confess, as they would be detained for only one year. However, both would still have incentives
not to maintain the deal, regardless of whether one entrepreneur believes that the other will confess
or not. As a result, they achieve a worse outcome for both of them, by being imprisoned for three
years. Hence, this is an accurate model of a dilemma that occurs in relationships between people.
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Should I cooperate, or is it better to adopt a selfish strategy and seek the greatest advantage for
myself at someone else’s expense?
2.4. Practical Application:A Dispute in a Fertile Land for Business
The beautiful Antalya, one of the five tourist cities in Turkey (Figure 3), has attracted many
businesses and professionals, who are looking for an unsaturated market in several different areas,
hence attracting thousands of tourists and business people a year, within a region that offers an
excellent quality of many things.
Figure 3. Antalya (Turkey)

This is the case of the two companies, Primer and Trend, who develop services and products that
are linked to the Internet of Things when applied to the hotel network. They are settling themselves
in the city, with no competitors in sight so far. The pricing policies that are being considered by
the directors of the two laboratories are setting high (HIP) or low prices (LOP) for their services.
2.4.1. Strategies and Payoffs
In this example, the payoffs involve annual invoicing and they were established according to the
market research that was commissioned by the laboratories:
• If the companies decide to charge high prices (HIP), the revenue will be $4 million each.
On the other hand, if the laboratories opt for low prices (LOP), the billing will be $3
million each.
• If one of the companies implements low prices and the other high prices, the first one
gets a turnover of $6 million, and the other one only invoices for $1 million.
This is a Static and Complete Information Game, which must be represented in a Normal or
Strategic form (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Normal or Strategic Form
TREND

HIP
LOP

PRIMER
HIP
LOP
4;4
1;6
6;1
3;3
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2.4.2. Solution
Realize that the low price strategy is strictly dominant for both of the companies, and the result
will be the strategy (low price; low price), generating a payoff of [$3 million; $3 million].
However, the result obtained is not the highest payoff possible for these two companies since they
would achieve a higher payoff if they played the high price strategy. As a result, this is the same
situation as it is in the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma. That is, despite the players’ rationality, the result
is not the best that could be achieved. All games that have the same payoff structure as in the
Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma have, according to Dixit and Skeath (1999), three essential
characteristics:
• Each player has two strategies: cooperate with the rival, or give up cooperation.
• Each player has a dominant strategy.
• The equilibrium solution that is found is worse (for both players) than it is for an
unbalanced situation.
2.5. Practical Application: Launching a New Service
Suppose that you are the strategy manager for KievRent, a company that rents cars, with vehicle
space for up to 5 people, and that has its base at Kyiv airport, the capital of Ukraine (Figure 5).
This company is considering acquiring vehicles with up to 7 seats, whose target audience is larger
families and participants in business events, with a view to increasing its revenue. Before acquiring
the cars, it must decide between carrying out market research (CMR), which involves a large
allocation of financial resources, or not conducting market research (NMR), which would save the
resources but would increase the uncertainty about the demand. But perhaps to wait (WAI), as its
main competitor, DerunyRent, is to launch a product with characteristics that are very similar to
what KievRent wants to introduce. Thus, they would be able to assess the scenario of their
opponent’s launch. If the competitor’s launch does not sell well, the KievRent Company has the
knowledge to understand the failure and to go in another direction. It should be noted that the
purpose of the market research would not be to determine whether the product should be launched
but what would be the likely demand. It should be considered that the DerunyRent Company has
a strategy manager who must also make the same decision.
Figure 5. Kyiv (Ukraine)
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2.5.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent the additional revenue that could be established by the individual forecasts
of the strategy managers of the two companies involved. Therefore, each manager has the
following set of possible situations:
• If KievRent and DerunyRent choose to conduct market research to better understand the
knowledge of the market, they both will have an additional revenue of $4 million. If they
decide not to conduct any research, then due to a lack of information, they both will only
realize $2 million in additional billing. If the two companies decide to wait for each
other, the larger cars will not be launched, and this decision will not increase their
revenue stream.
• If the KievRent Company decides to conduct this market research and the DerunyRent
Company decides to wait to make their decision, they will accomplish an additional
revenue of $6 and $3 million, respectively. On the other hand, if the DerunyRent
Company chooses not to conduct the survey, the KievRent Company gains a $4 million
increase in its sales, and the DerunyRent company earns $2 million, and vice versa.
• If the KievRent Company decides to not conduct the research and the DerunyRent
Company decides to wait, the former company acquires $2 million in additional revenue,
and the DerunyRent Company reaches $1.5 million in additional revenue. The same
procedure happens in the reverse situation: the DerunyRent Company searches, and the
KievRent Company waits. In either case, the chances of success of the company that does
not conduct the market research are smaller, and the other has an indirect gain from the
choice of its competitor.
This complete information static game can be graphically represented in a Normal or Strategic
form (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Normal or Strategic Form

KIEV RENT

RSB
KNS
WAI

KSH
4;4
1;4
3;6

DERUNY
CHO AAH
4;1
6;3
2;2
2;1,5
1,5;2
0;0

2.5.2. Solution
It can be noticed that the CMR strategy is strictly dominant for the DerunyRent Company manager,
despite whatever the KievRent Company chooses to do. For the DerunyRent Company, playing
CMR is always the best answer, as it always generates the most significant gains or payoffs. On
the other hand, this strategy is also strictly dominant for the KievRent Company manager, as this
is the best answer, regardless of what the other company does. So given the rationality of the
players, each manager should play the CMR strategy, and the result in terms of payoffs will be $4
million in additional revenue for each company.
2.6. Practical Application: Means of Advertising
The companies Magic Skates (MaS) and Fun on Wheels (FoW), which are located on the edge of
the Barceloneta Beach, in Barcelona (Spain) – (Figure 7), must decide which is the best way to
promote their leading service – their magic skates or their bicycle rental.
18
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/m3publishing/vol20/iss9781955833066/1
DOI: 10.5038/9781955833066

Tavares: Game theory – Applied to tourism

Figure 7. Barceloneta Beach (Spain)

Among the media that they have considered, there are these options:
• Billboards (BIL) (a lower cost, although with a smaller reach area).
• A specialized magazine (SPM) (a higher cost than the billboards, but with a larger and
more selected reach).
• Instagram (INS) (the cost would depend on the extension of the campaign but with a
greater reach than the other two options).
The company Magic Skates has been in the market for a longer time than Fun on Wheels.
2.6.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent the percentage of growth in the companies’ revenues. The payoffs were
established based on market research studies, together with the available data on the number of
tourists that have visited the region in recent years. The strategies were determined based on a
survey of current customers. Thus, these are the following possibilities:
• If the two companies decide to advertise on billboards, they will have a 2% growth in
revenue. However, if MaS and FoW promote on Instagram, FoW and MaS will gain an
increase of 4% and 5%, respectively (this difference is due to having more time in the
market); If the two companies decide to advertise in a specialized magazine, they will
have a 3% growth in revenue.
• If FoW advertises through billboards and MaS through a specialized magazine, both will
see a growth of 2% and 3.5%, respectively (or vice versa). On the other hand, if MaS
decides to advertise on Instagram, FoW acquires a 1% growth and MaS achieves a 4%
growth (or vice versa).
• If the FoW Company advertises in a specialized magazine and MaS opts for Instagram,
the former will grow by 3.5% and the latter by 5% (or vice versa).
This game must be represented in a Normal or Strategic form (Figure 8).
Figure 8. Normal or Strategic Form

FUN ON WHEELS

BIL
SPM
INS

MAGIC SKATES
BIL
SPM
INS
2;2
2;3,5
1;4
3,5;2
3;3
3,5;5
4;1
5;3,5
4;5

19

University of South Florida M3 Center Publishing

2.6.2. Solution
The strategy to advertise on Instagram is strictly dominant for both the FoW and MaS companies,
as this social media platform is preferred by teenagers and young people, as well as the public that
has used the equipment of both of the companies. So both of them will play this strategy. The game
balance result will be (INS; INS); in terms of the payoffs, they will gain 4% and 5% of sales
volume, respectively. When there is no dominant strategy available for the players, the next step
is to verify the existence of strictly dominated strategies. This procedure is widely used in solving
static games with complete information, as will be seen below.
2.7. Strictly Dominated Strategies
A strategy is strictly dominated if, for any combination of the other players’ strategies, the payoff
achieved is strictly less than the payoff for any other strategy. Since the players are rational and
seek to maximize their interests, this strategy will never be chosen. In the Entrepreneurs’ dilemma
game, for example, not confessing is a strictly dominated strategy.
2.8. Practical Application: To Expand or Not to Expand?
To expand or not to expand? CleanTec has been in the market for 20 years producing cleaning
equipment for theme parks. Its headquarters are in Sarasota (USA) – Figure 9.
Figure 9. Sarasota (USA)

During this period, it has stabilized financially and strengthened its image with its clients. With
the COVID-19 pandemic and the new government, together with tourist demands regarding health
security, its sales have increased significantly. Orders were filled thanks to idle capacity from
periods of stable demand but CleanTec is now at its maximum production limit.
Their managers must decide whether to expand their production capacity (EXP), wait (WAI) to
see if the demand is fleeting, or not expand the business (NEX), hence avoiding the risks of having
even more idle capacity in the future. However, a complicating aspect is that given the high sales
in recent months, the SuperClean Company, which is also a manufacturer of cleaning products, is
evaluating the possibility of expanding its business and entering (ENT) this market, or not entering
(NEN) this market.
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2.8.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent the new orders that could be received by the CleanTec and SuperClean
Companies over the next 3 years, and these potential orders were obtained through a demand
forecast study. The strategies were determined based on a meeting that was held by the board of
directors of each of these companies, which were made up of senior and above senior employees.
Consequently, these are the following possibilities:
• If the SuperClean Company decides to enter and the CleanTec Company chooses to
expand, the first company initially fulfills 2,000 new orders, and the CleanTec Company
manages to gain an additional 3,500 new orders, due to its expansion. If the CleanTec
Company chooses to wait, the SuperClean Company realizes 2,500 new orders and
CleanTec acquires 3,600 new orders. The CleanTec Company, even without expanding,
manages to maintain a good volume of orders, thanks to its time in the market and the
loyalty of its customers.
• If the SuperClean Company decides to enter and CleanTec chooses not to expand,
SuperClean will enjoy 4,000 new orders and CleanTec will only have 1,000 new orders,
suffering a migration of its customers to its new competitor.
• If the SuperClean Company decides not to enter and the CleanTec Company chooses to
expand, the first one will not satisfy any more new orders, and CleanTec will manage to
only accomplish 2,500 orders (the orders will not be any higher because of the decision to
not enter by the SuperClean Company). This has influenced their potential consumers,
who have come to believe that a pandemic of this magnitude will not happen anytime
soon and, therefore, they would not buy the amount of equipment that they do today.
• If the SuperClean Company decides not to enter and CleanTec chooses to wait, the first
one will not fulfill any new orders and CleanTec will only achieve another 500 orders
(the orders will be a smaller amount, due to the decision of the two companies to not
believe very much in the return of the pandemic, and that the public and private sector
requirements would diminish over time).
• If the SuperClean Company decides not to join and the CleanTec Company chooses not
to expand, the former will have a potential loss of 1,000 new orders and CleanTec will
only get 500 new orders, due to the consumers’ distrust.
This game should be represented in a Normal form (Figure 10).
Figure 10. Normal or Strategic Form

SUPER CLEAN

ENT
NEN

EXP
2;3,5
0;2,5

CLEAN TEC
WAI
NEX
2,5;3,6
4;1
0;0,5
-1;0,5

2.8.2. Solution
In this game, the do not expand strategy is strictly dominated by the expand strategy of the
CleanTec Company, although this is not a strictly dominant strategy. On the other hand, for the
SuperClean Company, the no entry strategy is strictly dominated by the enter strategy. Therefore,
the SuperClean Company will enter, and the CleanTec Company will play wait. The result of the
game will be (ENT, WAI), and in terms of the payoffs, this will generate 2,500 and 3,600 new
orders, respectively.
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2.9. Iterated Elimination of the Strictly Dominated Strategies
As mentioned previously, there might be situations where both companies have strictly dominated
strategies. In this case, as the players are rational, they should not play. Therefore, such strategies
can be eliminated. After this elimination, the size of the game gets smaller. The new game that
comes up might then show another strategy of being strictly dominated (not existing before), which
must also be eliminated. This successive elimination of strictly dominated strategies is known as
the process of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. It consists of a broader
solution method than those that are mentioned above but requires much greater attention in
carrying out the process of identifying the equilibrium result.
2.10. Practical Application: Marketing Problems in the Clouds
Andes in the Cloud (AiC) – a Chilean-based helicopter tours company is having problems in its
Marketing Department. Its main competitor, the Happy Company (located in Santiago de Chile),
has always presented an aggressive marketing strategy, with creative advertising in various media,
and with a team of well-trained professionals (Figure 11).
Figure 11. Santiago de Chile

AiCi’s senior management must decide whether to hire new professionals (HNP), grant more funds
(GMF) to its Marketing Department, or adopt both of the attitudes simultaneously. The Happy
Company, knowing that CiC has problems in its marketing area, will have to decide whether it
also grants more funds (GMF) to its Marketing Department, whether it invests more in training its
professionals (ITP), or whether it does not react (NRE) at all to the attitudes of its competitor.
2.10.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent the percentage of the increase in sales and they were determined by market
research. AiCi’s strategies were selected based on the competitive advantages presented by the
Happy Company. Thus, these are the following possibilities:
• If both companies choose to grant more funds (GMF) for their Marketing Departments,
each will have a 2% increase in sales. If the AiC Company decides on the strategy of to
hire new professionals (HNP) and the Happy Company decides to grant more funds, both
companies will achieve a 3% increase in sales. If the AiC Company decides on the
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strategy of granting more funds (GMF) and hiring new professionals (HNP), the Happy
Company will have a 2% increase in sales, and AiC will attain a 4% increase in sales.
• Suppose that the Happy Company opts for the no reaction strategy (NRE). If the AiC
Company decides on the grant more funds strategy, the Happy Company sees a 1%
increase in sales, and AiC accomplishes a 3% increase in sales. Although the Happy
Company does not react, the promotion of products by the AiC Company ends up
attracting the attention of the consumer, who starts to demand similar services that are
available at the Happy Company. If AiC decides to hire new professionals, the Happy
Company does not accomplish any sales growth but AiC has a 4% increase in sales.
Finally, if AiC opts for both the hire new professionals and grant more funds strategies,
the Happy Company has a drop in sales volume but AiC gains a 4% increase in sales.
• If the Happy Company chooses the invest in training its professionals (ITP) strategy and
the AiC Company decides to grant more funds, the former has a sales growth of 2% and
AiC has a sales growth of 1.5%. If the AiC Company decides on the strategy of hire new
professionals, the Happy Company has a sales growth of 2.5%, and AiC experiences an
increase in sales of 3.5%. Finally, if AiC decides on both the granting more funds and
hiring new professionals strategies, Happy has a growth of 1.5% in sales, and AiC attains
an increase in sales of 3.5%.
This game is represented in a Normal or Strategic form (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Normal or Strategic Form

HAPPY

ANDES IN THE CLOUD
GMF
HMP
GMF & HMP
2;2
3;3
2;4
2;1,5
2,5;3,5
1,5;3,5
1;3
0;4
-1;4

GMF
ITP
NRE

2.10.2. Solution
The do not react strategy is strictly dominated by the grant more funds and the invest in training
its professionals strategies of the Happy Company. Therefore, the company will not play it at all
and maybe it will eliminate it. The game is then reduced to the shape that is depicted in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Reduced Normal or Strategic Form

HAPPY

GMF
ITP

ANDES IN THE CLOUD
GMF
GM
HMP
GMF & HMP
2;2
3;3
2;4
2;1,5
2,5;3,5
1,5;3,5

For the AiC Company, the grant more funds strategy is strictly dominated by the strategies of
hiring new professionals and granting more funds and hiring new professionals (the latter is not a
strictly dominant strategy). Therefore, it must be eliminated, causing the game to shrink, as shown
in Figure 14.
Figure 14. Solution

HAPPY

CON
NCO

ANDES IN THE CLOUD
CON
NCO
3;3
2;4
2,5;3,5
1,5;3,5
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AiC knows that Happy will play the grant more funds strategy (which then becomes strictly
dominant). AiC will then play the hiring new professionals (HNP) and grant more funds (GMF)
strategies, which will give it a higher payoff. Therefore, the result will be (GMF); (HNP), and
(GMF). In terms of the payoffs, the Happy Company will have a 2% growth in sales, and the AiC
Company will experience a 4% growth in sales. The process of the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies assumes that the players are rational. But not just that. According to Ornelas
(1994, p. 11), each player must know that the other players are also rational and that everyone
knows that they are all rational, and so on. Therefore, they have a common knowledge about the
information. Thus, it can be said that all of the players are rational.
2.11. Rationalizable Strategies
A strategy that is never the best answer for one player in a simultaneous game is not the best
answer for any of the other player’s strategies. As a result, it is never the best option among all of
the existing strategies. As the player is considered rational, he/she should never play it. This
concept is enough to understand rationalizable strategies. They might survive the iterated
elimination of strategies but they are never the best answer. Realize that a strictly mastered strategy
is never the best answer. Even so, a strategy that is never the best answer is not always a strictly
dominated strategy. In this case, it can be concluded that the number of strategies that are
eliminated when starting a process of the iterated elimination of strategies, which are never the
best answer, is at least equal to the number that would be eliminated in the process of the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
2.12. Practical Application: Automobile Industry
Two large car rental companies in Perth (Australia), Lince and Track, intend to consolidate their
brand in the market by acquiring new vehicles, which would increase the market share for each of
them (Figure 15). In this sense, they must decide whether to purchase a fleet of luxury cars (LUX),
SUVs (SUV), or popular cars (POP). It is assumed that these options above were established based
on market research that was commissioned by the two companies. Lince has a competitive
advantage related to costs, arising from a greater bargaining power with the vehicle manufacturers,
and it is known for offering services at a low price. On the other hand, Track is best known for
providing more resistant vehicles, which require little maintenance but whose luxury cars are
costly.
Figure 15. Perth (Australia)
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2.12.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent the value of new revenues, and they were determined through market
research. The strategies for each are identical. Thus, these are the following possibilities:
• If the two companies decide to buy luxury cars, Track has $2 million in new revenue and
Lince receives $3 million (design problems will affect both of the companies). If they
both decide to buy SUVs, Track will attain $5 million in new revenue (due to its
reputation for rugged cars), and Lince will gain $4 million in new revenue. Finally, if the
companies decide to buy popular cars, Track will earn $6 million in new revenue, and
Lince will achieve $3 million in new revenue (due to the reputation of not offering lowpriced vehicles).
• If Track buys luxury cars and Lince buys SUVs, the first company will achieve $3
million in new revenue, and Lince will accomplish $2 million in new revenue (although
Track offers luxury cars at higher prices, Lince does not appeal to SUV consumers,
which have a low-income profile, as verified in the survey). On the other hand, if Lince
opts for the cheaper cars, Track earns $3 million in new revenue but Lince only receives
$1 million in new revenue.
• If Track buys SUVs and Lince buys luxury cars, the former attains $4 million in new
revenue but Lince only receives $1 million in new revenue. Thereby, Track’s advantage
is in providing more resistant vehicles.
• If Track buys cheaper vehicles and Lince buys luxury cars, they both will earn only $1
million in new revenue. Having said that, if the Lince Company chooses to buy SUVs
and the Track Company chooses to buy more affordable vehicles, Lince will make $5
million in new revenue and Track will make $3 million in new revenue.
• If Lince buys popular cars and Track buys SUVs, Track achieves only $500k in new
revenue but Lince earns another $3 million in new revenue (their reputation for not
offering low-priced vehicles does not outweigh the gains made possible by its better cost
structure, which allows for offering the consumers of cheaper cars, the best cost-benefit
ratio).
This game is represented in a Normal or Strategic form (Figure 16).
Figure 16. Normal or Strategic Form

TRACK

LUX
SUV
POP

LUX
2;3
4;1
1;1

LINCE
SUV
3;2
5;4
3;5

POP
3;1
0,5;3
6;3

2.12.2. Solution
For Track, the luxury car (LC) strategy is never the best option (note that it is not strictly
dominated). For the Lince Company, the strategy of buying popular cars is also never the best
option (it is strictly dominated by the SUV strategy). Therefore, both of them must be eliminated.
The game is then reduced to the form as shown in Figure 17, which is represented in a Normal or
Strategic form. The SUV strategy is now strictly dominant for both of the companies and it is
played by both of them.
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Figure 17. Solution

TRACK

SUV
POP

LINCE
LUX
SUV
4;1
5;4
1;1
3;5

Thus, the Track Company obtains a payoff of $5 million and the Lince Company receives $4
million. Any strategies that have survived the iterated elimination of strategies, which are never
the best option, are called rationalizable strategies.
2.13. Nash’s Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium (NE) is an even broader strategy solution method than the iterated
elimination process of strictly dominated strategies. The eliminating strategies, which are never
the best answer, reveal the Nash equilibrium (NE). A set of strategies that constitute an NE must
necessarily survive these processes, although the opposite is generally not true. In a static game,
strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium, if, for every player, the strategies represent the best
response to the specified strategies of the other players. In other words, the NE is a combination
of strategies, where each player’s action is the best response to the other player’s action, and such
a combination of strategies will likely be the outcome of the game. In this case, each player
performs the best that he/she can, depending on the actions of the opponents, and no player has
any incentive to change their choices.
The strategies that constitute the Nash equilibrium in static games can be pure strategies (they
specify a plan of action in a non-random way for the players), or mixed strategies (they determine
that the moves will be chosen randomly from the system of pure strategies, with a specific
probability). Pure strategies have only been dealt with and explained so far; mixed strategies will
be analyzed at the end of this chapter.
2.13.1 How to Identify a Nash Equilibrium?
To find an NE, check for the best answer(s) for each strategy of the other player(s), proceeding
like this for all of the answers of the strategies. When there is a coincidence between the best
answers for all involved, this set of strategies will be an NE. This form of identification is also
known as cell-by-cell inspection.
2.14. Practical Application: Offering a Better Price
The Max Funny Company has been operating in the hotel pool and playground sector for 20 years
in Odessa, a beautiful city in Ukraine (Figure 18). It has an 8% share and it is the market leader
for many reasons, such as economies of scale, good logistics, on-time delivery, and no complaints
filed with the consumer protection agencies. The Max Smile Company also operates in this sector,
and although it has only been in the market for four years, it holds a 3% share. Both of the
companies want to increase their market share, by adopting a lower selling price.
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Figure 18. Odessa (Ukraine)

For this, they can take the following measures:
• Establish long-term contracts (LTC) with their suppliers (and obtain a lower price for their
raw materials).
• Internally produce (INP) some of the raw materials.
• Use lower quality raw materials (LQM).
2.14.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent the percentage reduction in the price of the product offered and they were
determined based on the calculations made by the cost department of each company. The
strategies were established based on the competitive advantages of each company. These are the
following possibilities:
• If the two companies decide to enter long-term contracts, each will be able to reduce the
price of their product by 10%. If both of the companies intend to internally produce, Max
Funny will be able to reduce its prices by 7%, and Max Smile will lower its prices by
5.5%. If they both choose to use lower quality raw materials, Max Funny will reduce
their prices by 4%, and Max Smile will reduce their prices by 5%.
• B) If Max Funny decides to enter long-term contracts and Max Smile chooses to
internally produce, the companies will reduce their prices by 7% and 11%, respectively
(Max Smile will need more raw material and it will buy a larger quantity, with a
reduction in costs). Likewise, if Max Smile decides to use inferior quality raw materials,
the companies will reduce their costs by 11% and 4%, respectively, and vice versa.
• C) If Max Smile decides to internally produce and Max Funny chooses to use lower
quality raw material, the companies will manage to reduce their costs by 8% and 7%,
respectively, and vice versa. Suppose that Max Smile decides to make long-term
contracts, and Max Funny chooses to internally produce. In that case, the former will
reduce its prices by 5.8%, and Max Funny will reduce its prices by 9.8% (because it has
only recently been in the market, Max Smile gets reasonable discounts).
This game, as just described, is represented as seen in Figure 19.
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Figure 19. Normal or Strategic Form

MAX SMILE

LUX
SUV
POP

LUX
10;10
11;7
4;11

MAX FUNNY
SUV
POP
5,8;9,8
11;4
5,5;7
8;7
7;8
5;4

It can be noticed that there is neither a strictly dominated strategy nor a strictly dominant strategy.
Furthermore, it is not possible to reduce the game by the iterated elimination of strategies that are
never the best answer. The solution method will then be by cell-by-cell inspection to identify the
NE, thus verifying a coincidence of the best answers. The possibilities are as follows:
• If Max Smile plays LTC, what is Max Funny’s best response? It would also be playing
LTC. If Max Smile plays to internally produce (INP), what is Max Funny’s best
response? It does not matter which of the strategies it plays. If Max Smile plays lower
quality raw materials (LQM), what is the best response from Max Funny? To play longterm contracts (LTC).
• If Max Funny plays LTC, what is Max Smile’s best answer? It would be to play
internally produce. If Maximus plays to produce in-house, what is Minimus’s best
response? It is by playing inferior quality raw materials. If Max Funny plays LQM, what
is Max Smile’s best answer? It is by playing long-term contracts. It is enough to check if
any cell obtained by the payoffs sees if these results are a coincidence of the better
responses. This is a combination of the strategies that constitute the best response to the
actions of each one of them.
This check can be conducted as shown in Figure 20.
Figure 20. Solution

MAX SMILE

LUX
SUV
POP

LUX
10;10
11;7
4;11

MAX FUNNY
SUV
5,8;9,8
5,5;7
7;8

POP
11;4
8;7
5;4

2.14.2. Solution
The long-term contracts strategy is always the best answer for Max Funny, whatever is the Max
Smile strategy. As Max Funny will play this strategy, Max Smile must choose the INP strategy.
This is the best response when Max Funny plays the long-term contracts strategy. According to
the previous analysis, the NE is characterized by the strategies of internally producing (INP) and
long-term contracts (LTC). In terms of the payoffs, 11% is realized for Max Funny and 7% is
earned for Max Smile. No company should have an incentive to deviate from this outcome if it
believes that it should happen.
Most of the examples that are found in Game Theory literature involve only two players, which
can be justified for two reasons. The first reason is that most real situations of interdependence
occur with only two players. The other reason is that the analysis of games, with only two players
involved, is technically much more straightforward, although the analysis logic remains precisely
the same. In this case, there are as many two-dimensional matrices, as the strategies that are built.
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Nevertheless, programs such as GAMBIT, propose determining the balances in simultaneous and
sequential games, in both pure and mixed strategies.
Currently, most commercial and industrial sectors are dominated by a few large companies, and
the interactions between them usually result in a few players, if not just two players. In Game
Theory literature, the rules for placing payoffs in the cell when involving three players, for
example, obey the following configuration: the payoff on the left corresponds to player 1, the
payoff in the center corresponds to player 2, and the payoff to the right corresponds to player 3.
To find the best answers for each player, proceed as before, checking the strategy that generates
the highest payoff for each existing possibility. The point is that now, these possibilities are
combinations of other strategies, and a player must always stay out of the matrix that represents
the game, as it will be analyzed when considering the choice that was already made by the player.
2.15. Practical Application: Modernization of the Bus Fleet
The South, North, and Southeast Companies are local tour agencies that use buses, with up to 32
seats, in beautiful Fortaleza, the capital of Ceará (Brazil) – Figure 21.
Figure 21. Fortaleza (Brazil)

South is the market leader and among the three companies, it has the largest fleet of buses. North
has a cost structure that gives it a certain advantage over its two main competitors. Southeast,
although new to the market, has a good relationship with its suppliers, always obtaining longer
payment terms. South intends to modernize its fleet and has to decide whether to install a 5G WiFi
network (I5G) or install surveillance cameras (ISC) on its buses. The North and Southeast
Companies have the same strategies for modernizing their fleets. For the payoffs, Southeast is
player 1; North is player 2; South is player 3.
2.15.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs were obtained according to a forecast that was arrived at by the entrepreneurs and
specialists in the urban transport sector, and they represent the percentage of increase in the volume
of passengers. The strategies were selected from a survey that was carried out with alternative
transport users (they do not use the buses for their daily commute). For example, if South chooses
to use a WiFi network, the game has the following possibilities:
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•

South attains a 4% increase in passenger volume if Southeast chooses a WiFi network
(this has a 5% increase, as it can buy them longer payment terms). If North also makes
the same choice, this will afford them a 2% increase in the volume of passengers (its cost
structure does not influence the installation of a WiFi network).
• South achieves a 3% increase in passenger volume if Southeast chooses to install
surveillance cameras (this has a 6% increase, as passengers perceive the improvement
and feel safer). If North also makes the same choice as Southeast, this results in a 5%
increase in the volume of passengers (its cost structure influences the maintenance of the
devices).
• South obtains a 3% increase in passenger volume if Southeast chooses to install a WiFi
network (this has a 3% increase, as the purchase of a WiFi network will not realize very
favorable payment terms). If North chooses to install surveillance cameras in their fleet,
they will receive a 7% increase in the volume of passengers (due to passenger migration).
• South obtains a 3% increase in the volume of passengers if Southeast chooses to install
surveillance cameras (which generates a 7% increase, due to the migration of
passengers). If North decides to install a WiFi network in its fleet, it will experience a 4%
increase in growth.
The game described above can be represented in a Normal or Strategic form, as shown in Figure
22.
Figure 22. Normal or Strategic Form
NORTH

SOUTHEAST

I5G
ICA

I5G
5;2;4
7;4;3

ICA
3;7;3
6;5;3

If South chooses to install surveillance cameras in its fleet, the game has the following possibilities:
• South obtains an 8% increase in passenger volume when Southeast chooses to install a
WiFi network (which gives it a 2% increase, as it manages to acquire longer payment
terms). When North also chooses to install a WiFi network (this generates a 1% increase
in the volume of passengers for South, as its cost structure does not influence the
installation and maintenance of the WiFi network).
• South obtains a 6% increase in passenger volume when Southeast chooses to install
surveillance cameras (which gives it a 5% increase). When North makes the same choice
as the other two companies (this generates a 5% growth increase in the volume of
passengers, as the companies receive new customers, who did not hire these services
previously).
• South obtains a 6% increase in the volume of passengers when Southeast chooses to
install a WiFi network (which gives it an increase of 3% in the volume of passengers, due
to the migration of passengers). When North decides to install surveillance cameras, this
provides the company with a 7% growth increase in the volume of passengers (its cost
structure can influence the maintenance of the surveillance cameras).
• South obtains a 5% increase in passenger volume when Southeast chooses to install
surveillance cameras (this establishes that the Southeast Company will gain an increase
of 7% in the volume of passengers). When North decides to install a WiFi network in its
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fleet (this experiences a growth of 2% in the volume of passengers since its cost structure
does not influence the installation and the maintenance of the WiFi network).
The game can be represented, as seen in Figure 23.
Figure 23. Normal or Strategic Form
SOUTH

I5G
ICA

NORTH
I5G
ICA
2;1;8
3;7;6
7;3;5
5;5;6

2.15.2. Solution
It is possible to notice from the cell-by-cell inspection that placing surveillance cameras for the
North and Southeast companies is a strictly dominant strategy, regardless of what the South
Company chooses to do. As South knows that the choice of its competitors will be the surveillance
cameras strategy, this firm decides to also place surveillance cameras in its fleet, obtaining a payoff
of 5% (which is, of course, greater than the 3% payoff it would have had if it chose to install a
WiFi network). Therefore, the NE is characterized by its strategy (ISC; ISC; ISC). In terms of the
payoffs, this results in a 5% growth in the volume of passengers for all of the companies.
2.16. More About Nash’s Equilibrium
If a particular set of strategies is known to all of the players and is foreseen as a solution for a static
game, then this should constitute an NE. If this does not happen, some companies (players) will
obtain a greater payoff by playing another strategy and have incentives to deviate from the initial
proposal.
An NE (at least one) is guaranteed by the theorem that was proved by John Nash himself in the
1950s, as long as the game in question is finite. Nash’s theorem says that in every finite game,
there is at least one Nash equilibrium, even if it is in mixed strategies. When analyzing an NE,
questions about whether it can actually be played, and its consistency in terms of being a technique
of reasonable predictability, are inevitably raised. About the effectiveness of an NE, some
comments will be made below. If there is a single predicted result for the game, the players must
visualize it. Moreover, lest they have the incentive to deviate, that result must be a Nash
equilibrium. Be that as it may, an NE is not necessarily a justification for it to be played, even if
there is only one NE. Because of this, it is necessary to obtain more robust reasons for playing
certain sets of strategies. The history of a company, a government, or any other agent having
cultural issues, customs, and traditions of communities, or groups of people, can facilitate the
identification of an NE. Such factors are known as focal points, which may result from the common
understanding that specific strategies can be chosen quite obviously by the players. For the focal
point to be stable — that is, for the players to have no incentive to deviate from that outcome — it
must necessarily be an NE. Another issue is the possibility of prior negotiation between the
companies; for instance, they can establish an agreement and determine an obvious path to follow.
So that companies do not deviate (since they have no obligation to comply with it, unless there is
a contract between the parties), this agreement must constitute an NE.
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2.17. Mixed Strategies
In all of the examples that have been used so far, it has been assumed that the players always
choose a specific strategy to play. For example, a company decides to wage a price war, or settle
down and promote its brand on billboards or magazines. As a matter of course, there may be
situations where it is impossible to find the game’s NE with pure strategies or to find more than
one NE. In this case, the concept of mixed strategies must be used, which in essence, exists to
determine the game’s outcome.
A mixed strategy for a particular player is a distribution of the probabilities, over some, or even
over all of the possible strategies to be implemented. In other words, a mixed strategy specifies the
probabilities (whose sum is, of course, equal to 1) for a pure strategy, which will no longer be
chosen deterministically but probabilistically.
According to Oliveira (2007), the concept of mixed strategy transforms the players’ strategy spaces
into a continuum of possible choices. Suppose, for example, that the pure strategies of a certain
company are to pay on commission and offer a fixed salary to its employees. A mixed strategy is
the probability of distribution (p, 1 - p), where p is between 0 and 1, and it is the probability of
playing pay on commission, where (1 - p) is the probability of playing offer a fixed salary. This
can happen since the company can adjust the form of remuneration to its employees according to
the season — that is, in high season times, it can choose to pay on commission, and in low season
times, it can decide on a fixed salary. The mixed strategy (0.1), for example, is simply the pure
strategy of playing offer a fixed salary. To illustrate, a company might establish that for a certain
period (25% of 12 months), it will keep the price of its product low and that for 75% of the time
(the remaining nine months), it will maintain a price that is considered high in the market. This is
an example that characterizes mixed strategies since distribution is probable for each of the pure
strategies (low price and high price).
This kind of game can be represented in a Normal form, with the probability of adopting mixed
strategies, by defining the players involved and their pure strategies, with their respective
possibilities of being random (probabilities), and the payoffs. For example, a game with mixed
strategies that consist of two players, with each of them having two strategies, can be represented,
as shown in Figure 24.
Figure 24. Game With Mixed Strategies
PLAYER 1

A
B

PLAYER 2
X
Y
_;_
_;_
_;_
_;_

Probability
to play X

Probability to play A
Probability to play B

Probability
to play Y

To identify the NE with mixed strategies, the payoff of one of the players is calculated when he/she
chooses only pure strategies but allows the other to choose mixed strategies. A probability is then
found for one player to play this strategy so that it makes the other player indifferent between
playing any of their strategies in terms of the expected payoff. As a direct result, probabilities must
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be found that make the players indifferent between playing each of their pure strategies; then the
probabilities will determine the Nash Equilibrium.
2.18. Mixed Strategies and the Nash Equilibrium
The set of mixed strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium in each game if there is a pair of mixed
strategies, being one for each player, so that the combination of these strategies constitutes the best
answer in the face of other existing combinations. When a pair of mixed strategies is referred to,
it is said that the NE to be obtained is of the type (X%; Y%). In other words, the NE is formed by
the probabilities that make each player indifferent between any of their strategies. The most
important thing for a player is to determine the likelihood that the other player will choose a
specific strategy, which will make no difference to him in terms of the expected gains.
2.18.1. Practical Application: Modes of Remuneration
The Yellow and Red companies offer typical Indian products to tourists visiting this country, like
Pashmina Shawls. Their small factories are located in Aurangabad founded in 1610 (Figure 25).
The Yellow, the market leader, intends to promote its products in a better way. To do this, its
directors have come up with the following strategies: free product samples (FPS) in the most
important hotels in Aurangabad, or informative workshops (IWO) on the history of their products
in places that tourists widely visit. Red, which is more traditional than its competitor, must decide
whether to react (REA) to these strategies or to accommodate them – do not react (NRE).
Figure 25. Aurangabad (India)

2.18.2. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs were obtained as predicted by the managers of the two companies. They were based
on similar experiences in the field and they referred to the percentage of growth in brand
awareness. The principal shareholders of the Yellow and Red companies decided on the
strategies. These are the following possibilities:
• If Yellow opts for the free product samples (FPS) strategy and Red opts for the react
(REA) strategy, the first company attains a 4% growth rate and Red achieves a 3%
growth in brand awareness. If they choose the do not react (NRE) strategy, Red has a 0%
growth rate and Yellow has a 7% growth rate in brand awareness.
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•

If Yellow opts for the organize workshops (IWO) strategy and Red chooses the react
(REA) strategy, the former obtains a 5% growth rate in the level of brand awareness but
Red only obtains a growth of 1.8%. On the other hand, if Red opts for the do not react
(NRE) strategy, its company will achieve a 2% growth rate in brand awareness, and
Yellow will gain a 6% growth rate. This game can be represented, as shown in Figure 26.

Figure 26. Modes of Remuneration
RED

YELLOW
FPS
IWO
3;4
1,8;5
0;7
2;6

REA
NRE

Pya

Prr
1 - Prr

1 - Pya

It can be seen that in this strategic form, there is no strictly dominated strategy, no strictly dominant
strategy, or even no rationalizable strategy. It is not possible to determine the existence of a Nash
equilibrium in this game. With that in mind, at least one NE can be determined, even if it is in the
mixed strategies. The NE will now be addressed in mixed strategies.
2.18.3. Solution
To identify the NE, with mixed strategies, the payoff of one of the companies is calculated when
it chooses only pure strategies but allows the other to choose mixed strategies. A tip for the reader
to have more ease in solving games with mixed strategies is to use the following terminology:
Pxy = where P represents Probability; x represents the first letter of the player’s name, and y is the
first letter of the strategy’s name.
In the above game, it would have these representations:
• Prr = Probability of the Red company playing the react (REA) strategy
• Pyf = Probability of the Yellow company playing the free sample (FPS) strategy
• The pure possible strategies for Yellow are free product samples (FPS) and organize
workshops (IWO), and their payoffs are:
• Yellow’s expected payoff of free product samples (FPS) = 4 × the probability that Red
will play react (REA) (Prr) + 7 × the probability that Red will not play react (NRE) (1 –
Prr)
• Yellow’s expected payoff of organize workshops (IWO) = 5 × the probability that Red
will play react (REA) (Prr) + 6 × the probability that Red will not play react (NRE) (1 –
Prr).
• For Yellow to want to randomize (be indifferent), Red’s Probability of playing react
(REA) must be such that Yellow’s expected payoff of playing the free product samples
(FPS) strategy is equal to Yellow’s expected payoff of playing the organize workshops
(IWO) strategy.
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Matching each other, this obtains:
• 4 × (Prr) + 7 × (1 – Prr) = 5 × (Prr) + 6 × (1 – Prr) 4 Prr + 7 – 7 Prr = 5 Prr + 6 – 6 Prr + 4
Prr – 7 Prr – 5 Prr + 6 Prr = – 7 + 6 – 2 Prr = – 1 Prr = 0.50
• For Yellow to remain indifferent between playing any of its strategies, it becomes
necessary for Red to play react (REA) (and accommodate (NRE), in this case), with a
50% probability. If that happens, any action that Yellow takes will give the same
expected payoff (do the math yourself).
• The pure strategies possible for Red will now be analyzed, that is, react (REA) and not
react (NRE):
• Red’s expected payoff of react (REA) = 3 × the probability that Yellow will play free
product samples (FPS) (Pyf) + 1.8 × the probability that Yellow will not play free
product samples (NFS) (1 – Pyf).
• Red’s expected payoff of does not react (NRE) = 0 × the probability that Yellow will
play free product samples (FPS) (Pyf) + 2 × the probability that Yellow will not play free
product samples (NFS) (1 – Pyf).
• If Red wants to randomize, the probability of Yellow playing free product samples (FPS)
must be such that Red’s expected payoff by playing the react (REA) strategy is equal to
Red’s expected payoff by playing the do not react (NRE) strategy.
Matching each other, this obtains:
• 3 × (Pya) + 1.8 × (1 – Pya) = 0 × (Pya) + 2 × (1 – Pya)
• 3 Pya + 1.8 – 1.8 Pya = 0 + 2 – 2 Pya 1.2 Pya + 2 Pya = 2 – 1.8 3.2 Pya = 0.20 Pya = 0.06
• So for Red to remain indifferent between its strategies, it becomes necessary for Yellow
to play free product samples (FPS), with a 6% probability. If that happens, any action that
Red takes will give it the same expected payoff. On the other hand, if Red plays the react
(REA) strategy, with a 50% probability, Yellow will be indifferent between any of its
strategies. The only NE of this game is (Prr = 0.5; Pyf = 0.06). That is, Red plays the
react (REA) strategy, with a 50% probability, and Yellow plays the free product samples
(FPS) strategy, with a 6% chance.
Any odds other than those mentioned above will make the player no longer indifferent between
their pure strategies, which will lead the former to change his previous choice, and so on,
indefinitely. What would lead a player to randomize their strategies, as this would not increase
their expected payoff? It turns out that if the game is played several times, it becomes easy to see
the advantage of random behavior because by not doing so, the other player(s) will exploit this
predictability of conduct to their advantage.
Summary
•
•
•
•
•
•

Representation
Complete information static game resolution
Dominant strategies
Strictly dominated strategies
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
Rationalizable strategies
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Nash’s Equilibrium
How to identify a Nash Equilibrium?
More about Nash’s Equilibrium
Mixed strategies
Mixed strategies and the Nash Equilibrium
Summary
Questions

Complete Information Static Games reflect a situation in which a player’s choices are unknown to
the other players, even though the payoffs are known. These games are represented in a Normal or
Representative form. Several concepts of solving these games have been seen to determine the
Nash equilibrium:
• Strictly dominant strategies;
• Strictly dominated strategies;
• Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies; Iterated elimination of strategies that
are never the best answer;
• Nash equilibrium (cell-by-cell inspection);
• Mixed strategies.
The Nash Equilibrium, which was developed in the 1950s by John Nash Jr., states that for every
player, specific strategies correspond to the best response to the specified strategies of the other
players so that neither player has an incentive to change the game. Such strategies will likely be
the outcome of the game. A mixed strategy for a given player is a distribution of probabilities
about some or even all of the possible strategies to be implemented. This procedure should be
implemented when players want to vary their pure strategies during a specific time.
Questions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

What is a game? What are the essential elements of a game?
Define what a static game of complete information is.
Differentiate strictly dominant strategies from strictly dominated strategies.
What is the Nash Equilibrium?
Explain the process of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

Practical Application
In Cartagena of the Indies, each strategy manager of two of the largest bakery chains in the amazing
and exotic Colombia must decide whether to reorder wheat from their suppliers to meet the
growing demand for their bread and sweets (Figure 27).
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Figure 27. Cartagena of the Indies

With the release of the entry of tourists into the country, after the control of the COVID-19
pandemic in the country, these bakeries are once again the target of tourists. As these bakery chains
buy with a payment period of 30 days, and the invoice is in dollars, due to the fluctuation in the
exchange rate, the managers do not know if they should immediately order the wheat for payment
in installments (PIN); or if they should wait (WAI) a little longer to check the price movement; or
should the grain be ordered immediately and paid for in cash (PIC), leaving less cash on hand. The
possible strategies and payoffs (represented by the millions of pieces of bread and sweets that are
sold in high season) are:
• If both managers decide to buy in cash, each of the chains will sell 6 and 5 thousand
pieces of bread and sweets; if both decide to buy in installments, they will sell 4,000 units
each; if the managers decide to wait, both chains will sell 2,000 units each.
• If one of the managers decides to buy in cash and the other buys with a payment period of
30 days, the bakery chains will sell 5 and 3 thousand loaves, respectively, and vice versa.
If one of the managers decides to buy in cash and the other chooses to wait (WAI), the
two chains will sell 7 and 1 thousand loaves, respectively, and vice versa. If one of the
managers chooses to wait and the other decides to buy in installments (PIN), the bakery
chains will sell 2 and 3 thousand units, respectively, and vice versa.
This game is a Normal or Strategic form and it can be represented, as shown in Figure 28. Find
the NE of the game.
Figure 28. Normal or Strategic Form

BAKERY 1

PIC
PIN
WAI

PIC
6;5
3;5
1;7

BAKERY 2
PIN
WAI
5;3
7;1
4;4
3;2
2;3
2;2

The Summer and Dream companies manufacture sunscreens in Viana do Castelo (Figure 29), north
of Portugal. They compete for the preference of thousands of tourists, who go in search of their
fantastic architecture.
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Figure 29. Viana do Castelo

Both are launching an innovative product for the next summer season, and they have as pure
strategies, to launch in April (APR), or to launch in March (MAR). The intrinsic idea of these
businesses is that the company that takes longer to launch its product will lose sales. The game can
be represented in a Normal or Strategic form (Figure 30). Justify the payoffs and find Nash’s
Equilibrium (NE), with mixed strategies.
Figure 30. Normal or Strategic Form
DREAM

APR
MAR

SUMMER
APR
MAR
10;10
3;2
2;3
5;5

Suppose two companies in the diving equipment business want to increase their market share. Set
up a game in a Normal or Representative form for both companies. Each of the companies should
have one of two strategies: one should have a strictly dominated strategy, and the other opts for a
dominant strategy. Justify your payoffs and find the Nash Equilibrium of the game.
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Chapter 3: Dynamic Games of Complete and
Perfect Information
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Chapter 3: Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information
Key Terms
•
•
•
•
•

Dynamic games
Perfect memory
Sequentially rational strategies
Retroactive induction
Zermelo’s Theorem

In the static full-information games that were discussed in Chapter 2, all of the players involved
played simultaneously, not in the strict sense of the word, but in the sense that a player did not
know — at the time of making his/her choice — what the other players would choose. However,
in the business world, many situations involve reactions to the competitors’ particular attitudes or
postures, which can also provoke counterparts, meaning a duplicate copy of characteristics or
functions.
In these scenarios, a company must constantly ask itself, What is the possible response of its
competitors to a certain strategy that it will use? Therefore, this means that the actions taken in
the present will influence future actions and the payoffs. This movement characterizes dynamic
games of complete and perfect information, with a sequence of the players’ choices. The gains
resulting from each implemented strategy are common knowledge. Furthermore, such games have
perfect information, that is to say, the players know at the time of choosing their actions, what was
the entire previous history of the game, up until that moment. This procedure was not present and
did not occur in the games that have been studied so far. In this context, it is also considered that
the agents have perfect memory (or perfect recall); that is, they do not forget their previous moves
or the information that they held at a given moment in the game, even if it takes a long time.
An important issue in dynamic games is the credibility of the players’ threats and promises. It can
happen, for example, that the implementation of an action by a player gives him/her a worse result
than he/she would get if he/she had chosen any other action. Thus, your opponent should not
consider such threats, as he/she does not believe in any way that he/she would play them. It would
be a typical situation, for instance, of a company reducing its prices to very low levels, or below
cost for an extended period. This company’s competitors would hardly consider this a possibility,
which would probably constitute a bluff. In this case, it is said that the strategies and threats are
not endowed with any credibility. As a result, only sequentially rational strategies should be
considered, namely, those that do not involve threats or those without a minimum of credibility,
as well as those that would allow for an optimal result for the player in every decision that he/she
takes.
3.1. Representation
A dynamic game of complete and perfect information has the following information:
• a list of the players involved
• what each player can do (their actions), and whenever they must decide
• the order of moves in terms of who acts and when
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•
•

the game’s previous narrative, that is to mean, each player must know what happened in
the game when making their decision
the players’ payoffs for each possible set of actions that have been taken

A dynamic game is represented in the extensive form when it is more detailed and better visualized
than in the Strategic or Normal form that is used to describe static games. The representation
resembles the shape of a tree. In dynamic games, a single player must start by playing his/her
strategy from the initial decision node (white dot), as shown in Figure 31.
A decision node is a representative decision-making point, and this point is connected to the others
by tree branches, to connect the decision nodes (as stated previously, the representation resembles
the shape of a tree). It is noteworthy that in in-game theory classes, many students are concerned
with which player starts the game. The condition for a given company to play first can be decided
by market leadership, by taking the initiative before the others, or by a specific competitive
advantage. It can even be an advantage not to play first, and this would depend to a great extent
on the company’s conditions. There is a so-called decision node in situations where each player is
asked to decide (dark gray dot). There are also terminal decision nodes (light gray dot), in which
players only observe their respective payoffs. Figure 31 shows the structure of a game with two
players - and that is represented in an extensive form. Each player has two strategies. In dynamic
games, a single player must start by playing his/her strategy from the initial decision node (white
dot).
Figure 31. Extensive Form for Two Players

3.2. Retroactive Induction: A Way of Solving Dynamic Games
The expression ‘retroactive induction’ means that the game is solved backward. That is, it is
necessary to analyze the game from the payoffs, which are located in the terminal decision nodes.
Then, analyze each node, step by step, up until the beginning of the game, while checking to
determine which results would be obtained, as a result of the player’s decision who made the last
move.
By way of illustration, suppose player 1 chooses action A. What payoff will player 2 get on the
left side of the tree (Figure 31)? Then consider if player 1 chooses action B, what payoff will player
2 get in this case? You may have already noticed that player 1 will not randomly choose his/her
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action. Instead, his/her initial choice leads to where he/she wants the game to go, according to
his/her payoffs. Even so, it does mean that the player can anticipate your possible reactions and
play according to his/her interests.
To solve the game entirely by retroactive induction, the players must be able to identify every
possible outcome that is associated with every action available in the decision nodes. This
specifically means that the game has perfect and complete information. A situation in which two
companies play sequentially will be analyzed below, implying the need to put the game into an
extensive form and solve it by retroactive induction.
3.2.1. Practical Application: Consulting Companies
The Expert and Travel Adviser Companies operate in the Tourism Consultancy Market, focusing
on new developments in Orlando, Florida, USA. The city of Tampa, which is less than a 2-hour
drive from Orlando, has a large population that is booming and improving the quality of life in the
region. Tampa is now seen as a potential candidate to host new entertainment-related companies.
Both the Expert and Travel Adviser Companies realize and are aware of this market opportunity,
and they must decide whether to send employees (SEM) periodically to Tampa or settle there
through a physical office (PHO). The Expert Company prefers to wait to find out what the Travel
Adviser Company will do, and then decide their strategies.
3.2.2. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent a certain percentage of an increase in sales and they were determined based
on market research. The strategies were established based on the experience of the directors and
the consultants of each company. These are the following possibilities:
• Suppose that the Travel Adviser Company plays the strategy to set up a physical office.
In this case, if the Expert Company chooses to send employees (SEM), both companies
will receive a percentage increase in sales of 5% and 1%, respectively. If the Expert
Company opts for the strategy to set up a physical office, both of the companies will
obtain a 4% increase in sales.
• Suppose that the Travel Adviser Company plays the strategy to send employees. If the
Expert Company also sends employees, both companies will achieve a 3% and 2%
increase in sales, respectively. If the Expert Company opts for the strategy to set up a
physical office, both of these companies will obtain a 2% and 4% of growth in sales,
respectively. Figure 32 represents the dynamic set of complete and perfect information.
3.2.3. Solution
The resolution is made by retroactive induction. In that case, what result will the Expert Company
gain, as seen on the left side of the tree? A 4% payoff, by generating the strategy with the payoffs
[2;4]. On the right side of the tree, what result will the Expert Company achieve? A 4% payoff, by
generating the strategy with the payoffs [4;4]. This new game is depicted in Figure 33.
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Figure 32. Consulting Companies – Orlando (USA)

Figure 33. Consulting Companies – Solution

The Travel Adviser Company knows that if it plays the send employees strategy, it will receive a
payoff of only 2%. Consequently, it will play the set up a physical office strategy since it knows
that in this case, the Expert Company will also play the set up a physical office strategy, which
will then generate a 4% payoff in sales. The result will be [set up a physical office; set up a physical
office]; being specific, a 4% increase in each of the company’s revenue. A different example of a
dynamic game, with two companies in the mineral water sector displaying complete information,
will be considered next.
3.3. Practical Application: Threats in the Mineral Water Sector
The Léger and La Victoire Companies operate in the sparkling mineral water sector and they are
located in the beautiful region of Toulon, France, in the south of the country. The former company
intends to increase its market share, and it considers the possibility of lowering its prices (LOP) to
weaken La Victoire Company, or perhaps to even not reduce its prices (NRP). No matter what,
the latter company does not intend to reduce its market share, and it promises to act on the actions
of the Léger Company.
3.3.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs are the percentage increase in the companies’ market share and they were obtained
based on the price elasticity of demand for the product. The strategies were established by the
managers of each of the companies. The initiative to play first belongs to the Léger Company.
These are the following possibilities: If the Léger Company does not reduce the prices of its
products (NRP), it will obtain a payoff of 3%, and La Victoire Company will gain a payoff of 2%
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(the increase is due to the growth of the economy as a whole). On the other hand, if the Léger
Company decides to lower its prices (LOP), La Victoire Company will have two options: i)
maintain its prices (KEP) and earn a 1% payoff, while the Léger Company will gain a 4% payoff;
or ii) choose to lower its prices (LOP) more than the Léger Company’s prices. In this case, the
Léger Company will have two alternatives: a) either to maintain its prices (KEP) (both companies
will obtain a payoff of 2%); or b) to charge the same price French (CSP) as that of La Victoire
Company (then both companies will obtain a payoff of 1%). This dynamic game of complete and
perfect information must be represented, as shown in Figure 34.
Figure 34. Threats in the Mineral Water Sector

3.3.2. Solution
What would the Léger Company do if the game reached the third stage? The best thing would be
to keep the prices the same, as it would earn a payoff of 2%, instead of 1%. Knowing this, La
Victoire Company will choose an even lower price (ELP) and earn a 2% payoff, instead of the 1%
it would receive in the second stage if it kept the prices the same. In turn, the Léger Company
knows that La Victoire Company will choose this strategy in the second stage; hence, it would be
forced to play the strategy of not reduce its prices (NRP). Accordingly, the Léger Company would
receive a payoff of 3%, and La Victoire Company would achieve a 2% payoff, ending the game in
the third round. A further example of a dynamic game, with complete information involving two
supermarkets in the interior, will be discussed next.
3.4. Practical Application: Dispute Between Souvenir Shops
In the small village of Zermatt in the Swiss Alps, two traditional souvenir shops, named Chocolate
and Sled, intensely compete for the customers’ preference. The Chocolate Shop intends to increase
its sales volume, and an opinion survey has indicated a strategy to promote discounts on its
products (DIS) or to install a buy one, get one free type of promotion (PRO). As both shops are
well known in the city, the news resulting from these actions would spread quickly, and the Sled
Shop could not remain inert in the face of the situation. In this case, the Sled Shop will also have
to decide between promoting raffles (PRF) and the grant a more extended period for payment
strategy (EPP).
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3.4.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The owners of each of the souvenir shops established the payoffs based on market studies and they
represent the percentage increase in sales volume. These are the following possibilities:
• If the Chocolate Shop decides to offer the buy one, get one free promotion (PRO) and the
Sled Shop decides on promoting raffles (PRF), both of the shops will achieve a 3%
increase in sales volume. If the Sled Shop decides to grant a more extended period for
payment (EPP), both of the shops will accomplish a 3% and 5% increase in sales volume,
respectfully.
• If the Chocolate Shop decides to promote discounts on its products (DIS) and the Sled
Shop decides on promoting raffles (PRF), both of the shops will gain a 3% and 3.5%
increase in sales volume, respectively. On the other hand, if the Sled Shop decides on the
grant a more extended period for payment strategy (EPP), both of the shops will arrive at
a 4% increase in sales volume. This characterized dynamic game of complete and perfect
information should be represented, as shown in Figure 35.
Figure 35. Dynamic Game of Complete and Perfect Information - Souvenir Shops

3.4.2. Solution
Since this is a dynamic game of complete and perfect information, retroactive induction must be
used to solve it. If the Chocolate Shop decides to use the grant a more extended period for payment
strategy (EPP), the best strategy for the Sled Shop is to promote discounts on its products (DIS),
which will realize a 5% increase in sales volume for them and a 3% increase in sales volume for
the Chocolate Shop.
If the Chocolate Shop decides to use the discounts on its products (DIS) strategy, the best strategy
for the Sled Shop is the grant a more extended period for payment (EPP) strategy, which will
produce a 4% increase in sales volume for both of the shops. The new game that emerges after the
Sled Shop’s decisions is depicted in Figure 36. The perception that the Chocolate Shop will prefer
to play the discounts on its products (DIS) strategy is evident, as it will earn a 4% increase in sales
volume instead of 3%, which would be obtained if it played the buy one, get one free promotion
(PRO) strategy. As you can see, this game has a retroactive induction balancing result that is 4%
good for both of the shops.
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Figure 36. Solution - Dispute Between Souvenir Shops

Understand that dynamic games do not always involve only two players. There may be situations
where more players are involved, as well as other states of affairs, where only one player is
involved (Nature would be the other player). Imagine a situation in which the Z Company must
decide whether to invest in research, to produce goods that serve the younger public, or even the
older public, such as retirees. The Z Company makes its move, Nature will create its own strategy,
namely, a high or low birth rate, or a high or low life expectancy of the population. Depending on
the action of Nature, the Z Company can succeed or fail in the business arena.
3.5. Zermelo’s Theorem
In Game Theory, if similar payoffs occur for just one player, the chosen strategy will be the one
that results in the lowest payoff for its competitor, which shows that the player would not be
indifferent to the strategy to be chosen. At the same time, Game Theory does not leave this question
open. For this reason, it is opportune to present Zermelo’s theorem, as mentioned by Ornelas
(1994, p. 36): “every finite game of perfect information has a Nash Equilibrium (NE), in pure
strategies that can be obtained via retroactive induction”. In addition, if no player has equal
payoffs at different endpoints, only one NE can be derived, as the inexistence of distinct payoffs
at the endpoints is satisfied in this example. Hence, it becomes possible to find only one result.
Summary
Complete information dynamic games have a sequence of choices that the players involved can
make, and the gains arising from each implemented strategy are common knowledge. Because of
this, such games have perfect information, a characteristic this is also identified as agents having
perfect memory or perfect recall. By way of illustration, they do not forget their previous moves
or the information that they held at a certain point in the game, even if it is prolonged. These games
can be represented extensively, and they bring with them the following list of participating players,
the possible actions for each of them, the order of plays, the game’s history, and the player’s
payoffs for each possible set of actions that are available for them. Dynamic games of complete
and perfect information are solved by backward induction (the game is solved backward from the
terminal decision nodes). Furthermore, every finite game of perfect information has an NE, in pure
strategies that can be obtained via retroactive induction, if there are no equal payoffs at the different
endpoints, which is guaranteed by Zermelo’s theorem.
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Questions
1.
2.
3.
4.

Describe the subject, Complete Information Dynamic Games.
What does it mean to say that a game has perfect information?
Strategies must be sequentially rational. What does this mean?
Name the top five pieces of information inherent in dynamic games of complete and
perfect information.
5. Characterize how dynamic games of complete information are represented.
6. Explain the expression ‘retroactive induction’.
7. Practical application: Peruvian Snack Bars.
Three large chains of snack bars specializing in Peruvian food have been carrying out studies to
assess the possibility of settling in Hong Kong – the most visited city in the world in 2019 (WTTC,
2020). The options are a) establishing and settling in the airport building (AIR); b) in the busy
downtown area (DTA); or c) to not expend in the medium term (NOE). Ceviche, the market leader,
must first decide where to settle. The Tacu Tacu chain, although it has the second-largest market
share, prefers to wait for the decision to be taken by the leading company since for some reasons
related to logistics, it is unable to install itself in the airport building. The third-largest chain of
eateries, Peruvian Dreams, can install itself both in the airport building (AIR) and in the busy
downtown area (DTA), although it also prefers to observe the actions of the two largest chains
before making its decision.
The payoffs represent the estimated revenue in millions of dollars, and they were calculated based
on the flow of people circulating through the airport’s food court, and in the busy downtown area
(close to the location where the new chain is to be installed). The first, second, and third payoffs
at the terminal decision nodes are from Ceviche, Tacu Tacu, and Peruvian Dreams. This situation
can be represented, as shown in Figure 37.
Figure 37. Dynamic Game of Complete and Perfect Information - Peruvian Food Snack Bars
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These are the following possibilities:
• If the Ceviche chain decides to install itself in the airport building (AIR), the other snack
bar chains (Tacu Tacu and Peruvian Dreams) will decide to not expand in the medium
term (NOE). That being so, Ceviche will reach $ 7 million, and the other chain networks
will continue with the same revenue as before ($ 1 and $ 0.5 million, respectively), and
the game ends. If the Ceviche chain decides to not settle (NOS) in the airport building,
then the other chains will choose to not expand in the medium term (NOE), as they
believe that the decision of the leading chain has been made based on secure market
information. The three networks will then reach $ 5, $ 2, and $ 1 million, respectively,
and the game ends. Finally, if the Ceviche chain network decides to install itself in the
busy downtown area (DTA), the Tacu Tacu chain network must decide whether to install
itself in the busy downtown area (DTA) or to not expand in the medium term (NOE). The
actions of the Peruvian Dreams chain, as well as the payoffs, will depend on the decision
of the Tacu Tacu chain.
• If the Tacu Tacu cafeteria chain decides to set up in the busy downtown area (DTA), then
Peruvian Dreams can set up in the airport (AIR), and the payoffs would be $ 6, $ 4, and $
4 million, respectively. If Peruvian Dreams sets itself up in the busy downtown area
(DTA), the payoffs would be $ 7, $ 4, and $ 3 million, respectively. If Peruvian Dreams
decides to not expand in the medium term (NOE), the payoffs would be $ 6, $ 5, and $ 1
million.
• If the Tacu Tacu cafeteria chain decides to not expand in the medium term (NOE), the
Peruvian Dreams chain can be installed in the airport (AIR), and the payoffs would be $
7, $ 2, and $ 5 million, respectively. If Peruvian Dreams sets itself up in the busy
downtown area (DTA), the payoffs would be $ 7, $ 1.5, and $ 4 million, respectively. If
Peruvian Dreams decides to not expand in the medium term (NOE), the payoffs would be
$ 6, $ 2, and $ 1 million, respectively.
Practical Application: Find the Nash Equilibrium
Two large sporting goods companies are based in Lappeenranta, Finland. The Sports Corp and
the Action Corp want to increase the tourist potential of this beautiful city. They are studying the
possibility of sponsoring canoeing teams that already practice this sport on Lake Saimaa, which
borders some cities in the region. The Sports Corp, the market leader, will play first. In friendly
preparations for the start of the regional championship, the team’s results were not very
optimistic. Since the sponsorship contract is long-term, the validity period includes participation
in both the regional championship, which provides less visibility for the city, as well as the
national championship, which offers significantly more publicity for Lappeenranta and its tourist
attractions. The payoffs represent the variation in the long-term tourists, and they were estimated
based on data that was obtained by the city’s School of Tourism and Hospitality. These are the
following possibilities:
• If the Sports Corp decides to not sponsor (NSP) the team, the Action Corp can also
decide to not sponsor (NSP), and both would obtain a payoff of -1% (not sponsoring
would decrease the value of the brands). If the Action Corp decides to sponsor the team
(SPO) and then makes a proposal that is considered low (LOW) by advertising standards,
both of the companies would earn payoffs of –3% and 2%, respectively. If the Sports
Corp opts to sponsor the team (SPO), the Action Corp can decide to not sponsor the team
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•

•

(NSP), or maybe make a proposal (MAP). What the Sports Corp will do will depend on
the attitude and behavior of the Action Corp.
If the Action Corp decides to not sponsor (NSP) the team, the Sports Corp will be able to
increase their offer (IOF) (basically, it can remove potential sponsors that may become
concerned by the withdrawal of a large company like the Action Corp). The payoffs
would be -4% and 3%, respectively, (this decision would have harmful repercussions
among the people who are interested in canoeing), or it could keep the offer (KOF),
which would generate payoffs of –3% and 2%, respectively.
If the Action Corp decides to sponsor the team (SPO) and makes a proposal (MAP), the
Sports Corp may increase their original offer (IOF) (in doing so, remove the competition
permanently), generating a payoff of 2% (positive repercussions) and 4%, respectively
(although it did not win the dispute, the attitude would sound good to the canoe lovers);
or they could keep the original offer (KOF), which would generate payoffs of 3% and
2%, respectively. This game can be represented, as shown in Figure 38. Question: Find
the Nash equilibrium.

Figure 38. Two Large Sporting Goods Companies in Lappeenranta
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Chapter 4: Dynamic Games With Complete
and Imperfect Information
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Chapter 4: Dynamic Games With Complete and Imperfect
Information
Key Terms
•
•
•

Imperfect Information
Information Set
Subgame

The two previous chapters (Chapter 2 & Chapter 3) analyzed two kinds of games: a static game of
Complete Information and a Dynamic Game of Complete and Perfect Information. However, it is
common to find situations, which can be represented by dynamic or sequential games that contain
simultaneous parts in the business world. This implies the existence of ‘Imperfect Information’ at
one point in the game; that is to say, a player does not know what action was previously performed
by the other player, or players when he/she has to make his/her decision.
Suppose that, for example, a Sunrise Italian Shipping Company announced that it would launch a
loyalty program, which promises to be revolutionary in the industry. Of course, any of its big
competitors can respond to this threat. In this case, the Sunrise Company must prepare a reaction,
even before its competitors react. This situation describes a Dynamic Game of Complete and
Imperfect Information since the Sunrise Company may have to take a new counter-reaction
initiative, without knowing the other Company’s reactions.
Despite taking the first step - that of launching the loyalty program - the Sunrise Company must
try to anticipate the reaction of its competitors. Therefore, it will need to establish strategies that
contemplate all of the possibilities, as it will not know what was performed when implementing
them. Such a circumstance points to the existence of a part of the game, where the players must
make decisions simultaneously.
The part of the game that is played simultaneously must show that the player is not aware of which
decision node he/she is living in when he/she is called upon to decide. This identification can be
made by a circle around these decision nodes, characterizing the so-called ‘information set’, which
in this case, contains more than one decision node (although there might only be one decision node
indicating the information set). More precisely, a set of information in a dynamic game of complete
and imperfect information is formed by a set of decision nodes belonging to a particular player,
who for not knowing the game’s history, cannot locate the point of knowing where the decision
node lies. Thus, for example, in Figure 39, player 1 does not know of the decision made by player
2.
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Figure 39. Extensive Form With the Presence of an Information Set

4.1. Subgame
An essential concept for reaching the Nash Equilibrium in dynamic games is that of a subgame.
Formally, a subgame is a set of decision nodes and branches descending solely from a node; in
essence, it is named as the subset of a game.
In Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information, all existing decision nodes start as
subgames, which means that there will be as many subgames as there are nodes in this type of
game. Having said that, in dynamic games containing ‘imperfect information’ at some of its stages,
a subgame cannot be defined in such an uncomplicated way because its identification brings with
it two properties, according to Lins et al., (2013):
• Every subset starts from a set of information that contains a decision node; that is, it
cannot be connected to any other decision node and it has all of the decision points that
follow it.
• If a decision node belongs to a subset, then every node connected to it (which
characterizes a set of information) also belongs to this subset necessarily, which means to
say that it cannot cut any information set.
4.2. Identification of Subgames in Dynamic Games of Complete and Imperfect Information
In dynamic games that contain imperfect information, there is a dotted line around the decision
nodes that compose it, as shown in Figure 40, and this can identify a subgame.
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Figure 40. Extensive Form With Subgame Identification

In Figure 40, the information set shows imperfect information in a dynamic game of complete
information; to put this in another way, this part of the game is simultaneous. That is equivalent to
saying that when Firm One is called to decide, it does not know which choice Firm Two made in
the previous move, so it does not know which decision node it finds itself in. The way to solve this
type of game is simple and it consists of four steps:
• Identify the subgame or subgames that contain the imperfect information.
• Transform the part below the set of information (strategies and payoffs) into a static game
of complete information, representing it in a Normal or Strategic form.
• Solve the game in the Normal way and replace the subgame with the Nash Equilibrium
that is found.
• Compare the remaining payoffs in the dynamic game and determine the balance by
retroactive induction.
A situation will be analyzed now in which a Dynamic Game of Complete and Imperfect
Information is characterized, and this should be resolved according to the steps described above.
4.3. Practical Application: Relationship Between Customers and a Hotel
The famous hotel BourneStay in Bournemouth (Figure 41) – which is a town and a seaside resort
on the south coast of England – aims to become the most modern hotel in the country.
Figure 41. Bournemouth
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4.3.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs represent a simple numerical scale: the closer to ten, the more advantageous it will be
for the hotel and the guests to implement the strategies, whatever they may be. These are the
following possibilities:
• Suppose that the hotel chooses the strategy of to expand the use of the technology systems
in the rooms (TSR). If the guests decide to keep their intention to stay (KSH) and the
hotel chooses to return to the situation before (RSB), the payoffs will be 2 and 4,
respectively. If the hotel decides to keep the new strategy (KNS), the payoffs will be 5 for
the hotel and 1 for the guests.
• If the guests decide to change the hotel (CHO) and choose to go, the payoffs will be -4
for the hotel and –1 for the guests. If the hotel decides to keep the new strategy (KNS),
the payoffs will be -1 for the hotel and 1.5 for the guests. Finally, if the guests decide to
have a relationship with more than one hotel and the hotel decides to return to the
situation before (RSB), the payoffs will be -3 for the hotel and 1 for the guests. If the
hotel decides to keep the new strategy (KNS), both the hotel and the guests will have
payoffs).
• If the hotel opts for the self-service services (SSS) strategy, to implement more selfservice services, then if the guests decide to continue staying there, and the hotel decides
to return to the situation before (RSB), the payoffs will be –3 for the hotel and 5 for the
guests. If the hotel decides to keep the new strategy (KNS), the payoffs will be 5 for the
hotel and 1 for the guests.
• If the guests decide to change the hotel (CHO) and the hotel chooses to return to the
situation before (RSB), the payoffs will be –5 for the hotel and –1 for the guests. If the
hotel chooses to keep the new strategy (KNS), the payoffs will be –1 for the hotel and 2
for the guests. Finally, if the guests decide to have a relationship with more than one
hotel, and the hotel decides to return to the prior situation, the payoffs will be 1 for the
hotel and -1 for the guests. If the hotel decides to maintain its new strategy, both the hotel
and the guests will have payoffs.
The Dynamic Game of Complete and Imperfect Information that was experienced by the hotel and
its guests must be represented, as shown in Figure 42.
Figure 42. Extensive Form Relationship Between the Guests and the Hotel

54
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/m3publishing/vol20/iss9781955833066/1
DOI: 10.5038/9781955833066

Tavares: Game theory – Applied to tourism

To solve this game, the first step is to identify the subgame or subgames that contain the ‘imperfect
information’ (in this case, there are two). The procedure to be conducted next is to place the
strategies and the payoffs below the set of information in a Normal or Strategic form, and then
find the Nash Equilibrium (Figures 43 and 44).
Figure 43. Relationship Between the Guests and the Hotel: Left Side Subgame
BOURNESTAY

RSB
KNS

KSH
2;4
5;1

GUEST
CHO
-4;-1
-1;1,5

AAH
-3;-1
2;2

The strategy called keep the new strategy (KNS) is strictly dominant for the hotel and it should be
played. Based on this information, the guests will have to choose to have a relationship with more
than one hotel (CHO) during their stay in Bournemouth, resulting in a Nash Equilibrium that is
composed of the strategies (keep; relationship), and the payoffs will be (2; 2).
Figure 44. Relationship Between the Guests and the Hotel: Right Side Subgame
BOURNESTAY

RSB
KNS

KSH
-3;5
5;1

GUEST
CHO
-5;-1
-1;2

AAH
-1;1
3;3

The keep the new strategy (KNS) strategy is strictly dominant for the hotel. It should be played.
The guests will then have to choose the add strategy of implement more self-service services (SSS),
resulting in a Nash Equilibrium consisting of the strategies (keep; add), and the payoffs will be (3,
3).
The last step in solving this game consists of replacing the Nash Equilibria that are found in their
respective subgames and comparing them. Then determining the balance result by retroactive
induction. Finally, the game in the extensive form is reduced, as shown in Figure 45.
Figure 45. Relationship Between the Guests and the Hotel: The Extensive Form is Reduced

It is easy to see that the hotel will implement more self-service services (SSS), as this will achieve
a payoff of 3 (instead of 2). This particular choice also generates the highest possible payoff for
the guests, being specific, 3 (instead of 2), so that the expected result will be (3, 3). Two Dynamic
Games with ‘Imperfect Information’, whose subgames are wrongly identified, are presented next
(Figures 46 and 47).
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Figure 46. Incorrectly Identified Subgame

The game represented in Figure 46 shows a subgame that is not correctly identified since every
subgame must start from a set of information containing a single decision node, which is not the
case here. The example in Figure 47 presents a wrongly defined subgame, as no subgame can cut
a set of information, as it must contain all of the decision points that follow it.
Figure 47. Incorrectly Identified Subgame

In Dynamic Games of ‘Perfect Information’, all of the decision nodes start in a subgame. In this
type of game, there will be as many subgames as there are nodes. Before approaching the concept
of Nash Equilibrium in subgames, another situation that is characterized by a game of Complete
and Imperfect Information will be analyzed.
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4.4. Practical Application: War in the Online Hosting Industry
The Sleepy & Dream Company was founded in 2008 and this business operates in an online
hosting market in Krems an der Donau – a city that is approximately 70 kilometers from Vienna,
Austria (Figure 48). Attracted by the extraordinary profits of this company, a team of professionals
who previously worked for this company wants to enter this market, and they have founded a
competitor company, named The Nap Company.
Figure 48. Krems an der Donau (Austria)

4.4.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs were determined based on the estimates that were made by the online research
institutes. The strategies were determined by the directors of the Sleepy & Dream Company and
the Nap Company, respectively. If the Nap Company decides to stay out and not enter (NOE), then
the Sleepy & Dream Company will continue to earn high revenues. On the other hand, if the Nap
Company chooses to enter the market (ENT), the decision to fight the competitor (FTC), or settle
down and accommodate each other (ACC), must now be taken by the Sleepy & Dream Company.
Significantly, the decision taken by the Sleepy & Dream Company will not be known to the Nap
Company when it must play its turn, hence featuring a game with ‘imperfect information’ in at
least one of its stages. These are the following possibilities:
• If the Nap Company decides to stay out and to not enter (NOE), the payoffs will be zero
for Nap and two million for the Sleepy & Dream Company.
• If the Nap Company chooses to enter the market (ENT) and the Sleepy & Dream
Company decides to fight the competitor (FTC), then that will start a price war, with
much advertising, and other marketing efforts. The Nap Company can choose to fight the
competitor (FTC), but in this case, both of the companies will lose 800 thousand dollars.
Alternatively, they can both settle down and accommodate each other (ACC), realizing a
payoff of one million for the Nap Company and two million for the Sleepy & Dream
Company.
• If the Sleepy & Dream Company decides to settle down and accommodate each other
(ACC), then the Nap Company will decide to fight the competitor (FTC), and it will
receive a payoff of $2 million, while the Sleepy & Dream Company will only earn one
million dollars. If the Nap Company decides to settle down and accommodate each other
(ACC), it will have a payoff of $2 and a half million, and the Sleepy & Dream Company
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will achieve three million dollars.
This situation is shown in Figure 49.
Figure 49. War Between Two Online Hosting Companies

The set of information (the circle around the decision nodes of the Nap Company) indicates that it
does not know what the Sleepy & Dream Company’s previous move was. Once the subgame has
been identified, the strategies and the payoffs below the information set should be placed in a
Normal or Strategic form (Figure 50).
Figure 50. War Between Two Online Hosting Companies: The Normal or Strategic Form
Represents the Part That Contains the Imperfect Information
NAP

ACC
FTC

SLEEPY & DREAM
ACC
FTC
3;2,5
1;2
2; 1
- 0.8; - 0.8

For the strategy of accommodate each other (ACC), the two companies will conciliate each other,
resulting in the Nash Equilibrium. The subgame is then replaced by the newly found Nash
Equilibrium, and the remaining payoffs are compared, as shown in Figure 51.
Figure 51. War Between Two Online Hosting Companies: Reduced to the Extensive Form

Figure 51 shows that the Nap Company will choose the enter the market (ENT) strategy, as it will
earn a payoff of two and a half million dollars, while if it decided to not enter (NOE), it would sell
nothing. The result would then be (2.5; 3).
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4.5. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
The concept that is used to solve dynamic games with ‘imperfect information’ is considered an
improvement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is called the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium (SPNE). According to Mas-Colell (1995, p. 273), its objective is “to identify a Nash
Equilibrium that satisfies the principle of sequential rationality in games that involve imperfect
information.”
The SPNE corresponds to a set of strategies (in a dynamic game) that induces an NE in each of
the subgames that exist in the game. From this concept, it is possible to verify that every SPNE is
an NE. Contrarily, not every NE is an SPNE, as the latter does not allow for the players to consider
the threats that do not have a minimum of credibility, as the NE allows for this to happen.
The question of the ‘credibility of the strategies’ can explain these claims more clearly. A dynamic
game usually has only one Equilibrium but several Nash Equilibria can emerge if it is analyzed
strategically. Assessing strategies that constitute threats, without any credibility by the players, is
fundamental in reducing the number of potential equilibrium strategies. This means that it is
possible to find a Nash balance that does not achieve the status of an SPNE for the game.
In games with ‘perfect information’, the result of retroactive induction coincides with the set of
strategies that constitute an SPNE. This idea merited the following statement by Mas-Colell (1995,
p. 443), as an immediate consequence of Zermelo’s Theorem: “Every finite game of perfect
information has an SPNE of pure strategies. In addition, if no player has the same payoffs in two
of the game’s terminal stations, it can also be guaranteed that there is an SPNE that is unique”.
An analysis will be made next of a situation involving two television stations in dispute for a
renowned professional in the market. This example is intended to consolidate the concept of the
SPNE.
4.6. Practical Application: Companies That Perform Musicals on Broadway
In the exotic and fantastic Egypt´s capital, Cairo (Figure 52), two companies that perform musicals
– Songs Forever and Top Shows – have been fighting an intense dispute over the preference of
foreign tourists during the high season. A famous artist that was hired by the Songs Forever
Company over 20 years ago was very successful with his participation, and the Top Shows
Company is thinking of hiring him to reduce the strength of its competitor in the market.
Figure 52. Cairo
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4.6.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs were determined from the contracts that were made with the advertisers and they are
expressed in dollars. The strategies were established according to the nature of the conflict. The
possibilities are as follows:
• If the Top Shows Company decides to not hire the artist (NHI), the Songs Forever
Company can increase the proposal (ITP). In this case, the Songs Forever Company
would earn $3 million in advertising contracts and the Top Shows Company would gain
only $500,000. If the Top Shows Company decides to keep to the same salary (KSS), the
Songs Forever Company would only earn a million and a half dollars, as the advertisers
would think that he will not work as hard, as he has not had his salary raised. The Top
Shows Company will earn a million dollars in long-term contracts (they will hope that the
artist does not stay for too long at the Songs Forever Company, and will later go to the
Top Shows Company for even a lower salary proposal).
• If the Top Shows Company decides to hire the artist (HIR), by offering a specific salary,
the Songs Forever Company might exceed the Top Songs Company’s salary offer (TSO),
or perhaps offer the same salary (OSS). Having said that, the Top Shows Company does
not know of the attitude taken by the Songs Forever Company, and this characterizes an
‘imperfect information’ game. The Top Shows Company has two possibilities. It will
have to decide at the same time that the artist talks with the Songs Forever board, since
any delay in the Top Shows Company’s counterattack may allow for the artist to remain
with the competing broadcaster.
• If the Top Songs Company raises the artist’s salary, the Top Shows Company can only
hire him if it makes an irrefutable offer (IRO). In this case, the Top Shows Company will
secure the artist for its program and will win five million dollars in advertising contracts
(the dispute gives greater credibility to the artist, increasing the interests of the
advertisers). At the same time, the Top Songs Company will only earn one million
dollars. On the other hand, if the Top Shows Company decides to keep to the same salary
(KSS), the Top Songs Company will win four million dollars in contracts (this lowers the
expectations about the pool of artists and has demotivated the interest of the Top Shows
Company), so now, the Top Shows Company will only win one million dollars in new
contracts once again.
• If the Songs Company decides to offer the same salary (OSS), the Top Shows Company
will make an even bigger offer than the previous one, and increase the proposal (IHS);
this will guarantee that the artist will appear on its network and they will win four million
dollars in new contracts (the advertisers would find it strange that the Top Songs
Company did not raise the salary). The Top Songs Company will only attain two million
dollars (the advertisers would understand that the Top Songs Company had the prospect
of securing the artist and the bet on it happening failed). On the other hand, if the Top
Shows Company had decided to keep to the same salary (KSS), the broadcaster would
only earn $2 million (the fact that neither company raised the artist’s salary, reduced the
interest of the advertisers, making them suspicious of the artist’s trajectory of popularity).
Figure 53 represents this game.
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Figure 53. Companies That Perform Musicals on Broadway

4.6.2. Solution
The first step in the resolution of this game consists of identifying the subgame and the placement
of the strategies and payoffs, which are situated below the Normal or Strategic form of the
information set. The Normal or Strategic form represents the part that contains the ‘imperfect
information’. This solution can be seen in Figure 54.
Figure 54. Companies That Perform Musicals on Broadway and the Fight for the Audience
TOP SHOWS

IRO
KSS

TOP SONGS
IHS
KSS
5;1
4;2
1;4
2;2

It appears that the increase the proposal (ITP) strategy is strictly dominant for the Top Shows
Company, and it is the strategy that is chosen to be played. The Songs Forever Company will then
choose to raise the salary (RTS), as it will result in the biggest payoff. As a consequence, Nash’s
Equilibrium in this game is (increase the proposal; raise the salary), resulting in payoffs of $4 and
$2 million for the Songs Forever Company and the Top Shows Company, respectively. Next, the
NE that was obtained is substituted for the subgame in question (Figure 55).
Figure 55. Companies That Perform Musicals on Broadway and the Fight for the Audience: The
Reduced Extensive Form
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If the Top Shows Company plays the not hire the artist (NHI) strategy and the Songs Forever
Company decides to raise the salary (RTS), the companies will earn five hundred thousand dollars
and three million dollars in advertising contracts, respectively. On the other hand, if the Songs
Forever Company chooses to keep to the same salary (KSS), the companies will each earn a
million and a million and a half dollars, respectively. If the game reaches this decision node, the
Songs Forever Company will play the raise the salary (RTS) strategy. Substituting this result in
the game, the tree will be shown in Figure 56.
Figure 56. Companies That Perform Musicals on Broadway and the Fight for the Audience: The
Reduced Extensive Form

In the game just seen, the Top Shows Company chose to hire the artist (HIR), as they would
receive four million dollars in advertising revenue, instead of the five hundred thousand dollars
that they would have received if they did not hire him (NHI). The expected result of the game is
(HIR; OSS; ITP).
4.7. Considerations and Criticisms of the Nash Equilibrium
It is possible to get more than one Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in a game. Suppose
that after identifying a subgame that contains ‘imperfect information’ and placing it in a Normal
or Strategic form, two Nash equilibria are found. To determine the SPNE, you must place one NE
at a time, in place of the subgame, and proceed to the standard resolution by analyzing the
strategies and payoffs.
On the other hand, in games that involve monopoly firms and new entrants, it is possible to find
two or three Nash Equilibria when it is placed into a Normal or Strategic form. Such balances can
be made up of strategies that do not have a modicum of credibility. It may be that only one
equilibrium constitutes an SPNE – and that serves as a filter to capture the only sequentially
rational strategies.
The possibility of situations like the one reported above might occur and demonstrate a possible
vulnerability of the Nash Equilibrium concept. In fact, the criticisms arise from its own definition,
which would indicate a certain obviousness: if the player decides in isolation which decisions to
take, it would be normal for him/her to choose the best responses to the actions of the other players.
Another problem that is related to the Nash Equilibrium refers to the existence of too many
Equilibria in a game. Even with the filtering that is established by the SPNE, there are situations
in which the players do not have ‘complete information’ about their opponents, forcing the
development and implementation of another refinement, called the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE), which has an introductory character. This analysis is beyond the scope of this book. A
situation to be analyzed next shows the risks that are being taken even when solving a game by
retroactive induction.
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4.8. Practical Application: A Surprising Result
Figure 57 represents the centipede game, as disclosed by Rosenthal (1981). Based on an adaptation
in the context of this book, two companies specializing in souvenirs are assumed, namely Aurora
Borealis and Finland Lights. They are located in Tromsø city (Figure 58), an important starting
point to hunt for the Northern Lights in Finland.
Figure 57. Representation of the Centipede Game

Figure 58. Tromsø

Each time a company has a turn to play, it can stop the game, or continue it by passing the turn to
the other company. The payoffs have a peculiar logic. At each stage, whenever one company
decides to not finish the game at the following endpoint, it will gain one more minor payoff unit,
while the other company will attain two more payoff units.
The game must start to be solved by its end-point, from back to front. If the last round is reached,
the Aurora Borealis souvenir shop will prefer to play down and reach the payoff of 101. Knowing
this, the Finland Lights Company will choose to finish the game before the Aurora Borealis
Company makes its last round, as it would win a payoff of 99. The Aurora Borealis Company,
knowing this, would prefer to finish the game one round earlier to achieve a payoff of 100. This
goes on and on until the beginning of the game is reached, whereby the Finland Lights Company
will finish the game without giving the Aurora Borealis Company any further chances. Each of the
companies then earns one payoff unit. Although the result seems paradoxical, it is just a result of
the common knowledge of the players’ rationality. There is, in this example, a single SPNE, which
is used to withdraw at each stage of the game (which is worse for both of the companies). The
companies would probably play the game almost to its end, showing that the players’ rationality
can be questioned.
Summary
Except for the centipede game, all practical applications in this chapter show a situation that is
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characterized by Dynamic Games with Imperfect and Incomplete Information. That is to say, in at
least some of the game’s stages, a particular player does not know the game’s history. To solve
games with these characteristics, it is necessary to identify the subgame that contains the ‘imperfect
information’ and place it in a Normal or Strategic form, then see the strategies and payoffs that are
located below the set of information. Once identified, for the Equilibrium or the Nash Equilibria,
the analyzed subgame must be replaced by the results found.
After transforming Dynamic Games with Complete and Imperfect Information into Normal form
games, it is possible to find an NE that was formed by the strategies without credibility. To solve
the problem, you can use the concept of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE). The
SPNE is formed by the strategies that induced an NE in each of the game’s subgames, which works
as a filter for the sequentially rational strategies.
Questions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What does it mean to have ‘imperfect information’ in some part of a dynamic game?
Conceptualize the subgame and set its properties.
What is the meaning of the circle around a player’s decision nodes?
Conceptualize the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE).
Define Zermelo’s Theorem.
Suppose that two companies tour the Canary Islands and they want to make their brands
better known in the Asian market. Set up a game in the Extensive form, with each of
them having three strategies, with one of these companies being the market leader that
charges lower prices. Justify your payoffs and find the game’s Nash Equilibrium.

Practical Application: Airline Companies
After the September 11 attacks in the United States, the airlines suffered successive drops in the
number of passengers on their flights in the weeks following the tragedy. To attract previously
regular passengers, the Hungarian airline companies called Fly One and Air Direct (Figure 59)
have introduced various strategies, whose actions include:
• Frequent Flyer Programs (FFP)
• Service Transfer Offers (STO)
• Discounts are offered on all Tickets and at all Flight Times (DOF)
Figure 59. Budapest
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First, the companies’ strategies and payoffs that are listed below, of course, have the option of not
offering any promotions at all to its customers. The payoffs represent the percentage of increase
in passenger volume. They were obtained from the results of an opinion survey that was carried
out among potential customers. The strategies were implemented based on the experience of the
airline managers in this sector. Each possible situation is represented separately. In the end, all of
the situations will be described by one game only. These are the following possibilities:
• If the FlyOne Company decides to not offer benefits to its passengers (NOB), the
AirDirect Company has two options: a) do not offer anything (NOA), generating payoffs
of 0% for both of the companies; or b) offer a frequent flyer program (FFP). This would
result in payoffs of –1% and 3% for both of the companies, respectively. Alternatively,
they could offer a service transfer offer (STO), which would generate payoffs of –3% and
6% for both of the companies, respectively (Figure 60).
Figure 60. Partial Representation in an Extensive Form

•

If the FlyOne Company chooses the discounts offered (DOF) strategy, AirDirect only has
two options (The promotion of discounts is traditionally a policy that the company will
never adopt because they understand that such an attitude will devalue their services). So
they will be offering a frequent flyer program (FFP) or providing a service transfer offer
strategy. That being so, the FlyOne Company will react to any AirDirect benefit
implementation, even without knowing its competitor’s advantage.
• If the AirDirect Company offers a service transfer offer (STO), the FlyOne Company can
react by awarding a frequent flyer program (FFP), generating payoffs of 3% and 9% for
the two companies, respectively, or they could offer a service transfer offer (STO), which
would result in payoffs of 3% and 12% for both of the companies, respectively.
• If the AirDirect Company offers a frequent flyer program (FFP), the FlyOne Company
might react by also awarding a frequent flyer program (FFP), resulting in payoffs of 5%
for the AirDirect Company and 10% for the FlyOne Company. Alternatively, they could
provide a service transfer offer (STO), generating payoffs of 4% and 11% for the two
companies, respectively.
The situation described above can be represented as shown in Figure 61.
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Figure 61. Partial Representation in an Extensive Form

Suppose that the FlyOne Company offers a frequent flyer program (FFP). The AirDirect Company
again has two options. The first option would be to provide a frequent flyer program (FFP). In that
case, the FlyOne Company could react by choosing the discounts offered (DOF) strategy,
generating payoffs of 10% for the AirDirect Company and 5% for the FlyOne Company, or by
providing a service transfer offer (STO), generating payoffs of 4% for the AirDirect Company and
10% for the FlyOne Company. On the other hand, if the AirDirect Company opts for the service
transfer offer (STO) strategy, and the FlyOne Company does too, both will have payoffs of 6%
and 9%, respectively. If the FlyOne Company reacts by choosing the discounts offered (DOF)
strategy, it will have an 8% payoff, with AirDirect only receiving 5%. These possibilities can be
represented as shown in Figure 62.
Figure 62. Partial Representation in an Extensive Form
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Now suppose that the FlyOne Company offers a service transfer offer (STO). The AirDirect
Company will have only two options: a) to offer a service transfer offer as well or offer a frequent
flyer program (FFP). In that case, the FlyOne Company will react to any benefit that was provided
by the AirDirect Company, even without knowing what advantage its competitor offered. These
are the following possibilities:
• If the AirDirect Company offers a service transfer offer, the FlyOne Company can react
by choosing the discounts offered (DOF) strategy, which would generate a payoff of 10%
for itself and 3% for the AirDirect Company; or they could offer a frequent flyer program
(FFP), which would generate payoffs of 9% for itself and 6% for the AirDirect Company.
• If the AirDirect Company offers a frequent flyer program (FFP), the FlyOne Company
could react by choosing the discounts offered (DOF) strategy, generating a payoff of 11%
for the company and 4% for the AirDirect Company, respectively. Instead, they could
offer a frequent flyer program (FFP), which would generate payoffs of 10% for itself and
5% for the AirDirect Company.
These possibilities can be represented as shown in Figure 63. Find the game’s Nash Equilibrium.
Figure 63. Partial Representation in an Extensive Form
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Chapter 5: Repeated Games
Key Terms
•
•
•
•
•

Finite Repeated Games
Infinite Repeated Games
Trigger Strategy
Discount Factor
Return Rate

Some games are played more than once, leading to the thinking about the possibility of cooperation
between the players. To illustrate, one of the players cooperates today, so the others will cooperate
tomorrow when the situation repeats itself. For instance, consider that two companies in the
entertainment industry are fighting to purchase land to launch a theme park and that the supply of
land of adequate size is limited. One of them can propose a value by the size of the land, and the
other can then cover or not cover the value of that proposal. If the first of them reacts by increasing
the initial proposal, this could start a price war, with its competitor remaking and revising its
proposal. These companies know that this situation might be repeated a few times, as the
availability of suitable land for their activities is limited. If they both act rationally, with only one
proposal for each plot of land (and not two), the land could be bought at a more affordable price.
Finally, suppose that the amount of land that could receive this type of development is mapped
and that this number is odd. In that case, when they reach the last stage, these companies will have
no incentive to cooperate. This situation will be addressed next, which falls under the so-called
Finite Repeated Game, where the number of rounds of a game is known, as opposed to the Infinite
Repeated Games, in which the players do not know when the game will end.
5.1. Finite Repeated Games
In ‘finite repeated games’, the players involved know in advance how many times the game will
repeat itself, and it is this information that drives them to choose their strategies. The
Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma, as was discussed in Chapter 1, is a good example of the formulation of
the ‘finite repeated games’. For example, let us imagine that the entrepreneurs form a new cartel
when they get out of prison. Upon considering that situation, when a new game occurs, the
previous round’s result is already known to the entrepreneurs and it cannot be changed. This kind
of game must be resolved by analyzing what would happen in the second and final rounds (Figure
64).
The payoffs will be the sum of the winnings that are achieved in the two times that they are played.
How will the entrepreneurs act in the second round of the game? As this will be the last round,
there will no longer be incentives for cooperation. However, since they both have a strictly
dominant strategy to confess, they will inevitably play it in the second round (since the first one
cannot be modified).
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Figure 64. The Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma
ENTREPRENEUR 1

ENTREPRENEUR 2
CON
NCO
CON -1;-1
-5;0
NCO
0;-5
-3;-3

As was seen in the example of the companies wishing to acquire land for their theme parks, the
inherent idea of repeated games is that the cooperation can be beneficial since they will be played
more than once. Having said that, when reaching the last round of the game, no one would
cooperate anymore, as it would no longer be necessary to guarantee the opponent’s future
cooperation.
Regarding the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma being played twice, when starting the first stage, the
players already know that they will both confess and stay in jail for five years in the second stage.
Thus, by making this anticipation of the results, the original game is seen with the payoff of the
second round being added to the existing payoffs that were earned in the first stage (Figure 65).
Figure 65. The Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma – Two Rounds
ENTREPRENEUR 1

ENTREPRENEUR 2
CON
NCO
CON
-4;-4
-8;-3
NCO
-3;-8
-6;-6

It is noticed that the confess strategy remains strictly dominant for both of the entrepreneurs, and
again, a worse result is found for both of them. A situation will then be analyzed in which two
companies get a worse result than any other for both of them – due to the non-cooperation – even
with the game being played three times. Even so, it is possible to reach that last stage and the
players have an incentive to cooperate: it all depends on the game’s structure. See the example
below.
5.2. Practical Application: Industrial Espionage
The CloudBus and B&W Companies design, manufacture, and supply commercial aircraft for
airlines located near Malmo (Sweden), and they have fiercely competed in the jet aircraft market
of the world. At fairs and exhibitions in the sector, they compete for the best stands. They both try
to win over the best professionals in the market, and they post advertisements in the most important
media, with all of this happening to increase their respective market share.
Currently, they are both carrying out research investigations that seek to reduce carbon emissions
during their flights. As these projects are confidential, their directors must decide whether to hire
the industrial security (HIS) and counterintelligence service, to guarantee the secrecy of their
research, or to not hire this service (NHS). This service costs $5 million a year but the loss from a
possible discovery of formulas and processes is incalculable. For illustration, say that the research
cycle for this project is three years so the contract needs to be renewed three times.
5.2.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs are represented by the financial results of the set of strategies used and they were
established by the directors, based on the value of the annual contract and the increase in the
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company’s value, due to the reduction in carbon emissions. Each player knows not only their own
strategies but also those of their competitor. These are the following possibilities:
• If both companies decide to hire the industrial security and counterintelligence service
(HIS), they will pay $5 million a year each. If they decide to not hire this service (NHS),
both of the companies will save this amount annually.
• If only one of the companies decides to hire this service, it would spend $5 million a year.
Nevertheless, its assets would increase on the Stock Exchange (the investors would be
more confident in the success and exclusivity of the project), thus obtaining a net result of
$7 million a year. The competitor who did not contract this security service has saved $5
million a year but they lost $7 million a year, as the value of their shares declined) - thus
obtaining a net result of $ - 2 million a year – Figure 66.
Figure 66. B&W x CLOUD BUS
B&W

CON
NCO

CLOUD BUS
CON
NCO
-5;-5
2;-7
-7;2
5;5

This game can be solved by backward induction, starting at the third stage (Figure 67).
Figure 67. Industrial espionage: The Third Stage of the Game
B&W

CON
NCO

CLOUD BUS
CON
NCO
5;5
12;3
3;12
15;15

It can be realized and understood that the strategy of do not hire the industrial security (NHS) and
counterintelligence service is strictly dominant for both the two companies. Therefore, the
companies already know that they will play this strategy in the third stage and earn (save) $15
million each. The game that is visualized without the second stage can be represented in Figure
68.
Figure 68. Industrial Espionage: The Second Stage of the Game
B&W

CON
NCO

CLOUD BUS
CON
NCO
0;0
7;-2
-2;7
10;10

The original game was viewed by anticipating the outcomes, with the third stage payoff being
added to the existing second stage payoffs. At this stage, the strategy of do not hire the industrial
security and counterintelligence service is also strictly dominant for both of the companies and
must be played to advance the payoffs ($10 million; $10 million) – Figure 68. That is, they decide
to cooperate because they know that at the third stage, no one will cooperate.
The original game was seen with the second-round payoffs being added to the existing first-stage
payoffs. The do not hire the industrial security and counterintelligence service strategy remains a
strictly dominant strategy for both companies. This is because the companies know that in the third
and second stages, they will have the incentive to cooperate. In any event, the result obtained will
be better for both of them.
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5.3. Finite Repeated Game: Considerations
In repeated games and with this payoff structure, the result to be found will be the same as that
was obtained in the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma: a worse result for both of the players. Consequently,
cooperation could not be achieved in any year, even if one of these companies promised to
cooperate in the first year of the game, or even in any of the years. Cooperation would not exist in
practice because not cooperating (with the other cooperating) would result in a greater payoff, as
this is a dominant strategy. Note that in a ‘finite repeated game’ (where the players’ payoffs are
the sum of the payoffs obtained each time the game is repeated), they can have in the last year, a
result equal to what would have been obtained if the game was not repeated. This is even if there
is a combination of strategies that generate larger payoffs for all of the players (although this is not
an NE), which would not be possible to achieve through cooperation, as it does not exist at the end
of the game.
It would be reasonable for the companies to meet and renegotiate after the first year. In this case,
for the second year, a better result for both could be achieved. Even if one of the companies accuses
the other of treason in the first year, being rational, they must understand that what was lost can
no longer be recovered and future payoffs must be considered. That being so if the companies
know that there is a real possibility of renegotiation after the first year, no one will have reasons
to cooperate in the first year. The result will be bad for both of them again. A different case arises
when more than one NE in the game will be played more than once, as can be seen in Practical
Application 5.4.
5.4. Practical Application: Radio Stations and National Passion
The two largest sporting event promotion companies in Copenhagen, Denmark (Figure 69) – Snow
Games and Ice Games – are in contention to host three traditional events in the sporting world,
namely:
• A Tennis Tournament formed by former Grand Slam Champions (TTC)
• A Volleyball Championship between countries, with teams formed only by active
coaches (VCC)
• A Soccer Tournament composed of teams that have already won the World Cup (STW)
As these events are held every two years, consider that this dispute between the Snow Games and
Ice Games Companies will be repeated. The tournaments are expected to take place in the summer
of 2023.
Figure 69. Copenhagen
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5.4.1. Strategies and Payoffs
The payoffs are the number of spectators. This number has been estimated based on the data that
was obtained by the research institutes and reflects the in loco and TV audience of the broadcast
events. The strategies were established by the two sets of company directors. The possibilities are
as follows:
• If the two companies broadcast the TTC games, each will gain 2.5 million spectators. If
they both decide to host the VCC games, each company will enjoy 3.8 million spectators.
If the two companies use the STW strategy, they will each earn 3 million spectators.
• If the Snow Games Company chooses to use the TTC strategy and the Ice Games
Company chooses the STW strategy or vice versa, each will achieve 2 million spectators.
If the Snow Games Company chooses to use the VCC strategy and the Ice Games
Company chooses to use the STW strategy, or vice versa, the Snow Games Company will
accomplish one million spectators, and the Ice Games Company will attract 3 million
spectators or vice versa.
• If the Snow Games Company chooses to use the HVC strategy and the Ice Games
Company decides to use the HTT strategy, or vice versa, the Snow Games Company will
have 500k spectators, and the Ice Games Company will have 4 million spectators or vice
versa.
This game can be represented according to Figure 70.
Figure 70. The Snow Games Company & The Ice Games Company: First-round

SNOW GAMES

TTC
VCC
STW

TTC
2,5;2,5
0,5;4
2;2

CE GAMES
VCC
STW
4;0,5
2;2
3,8;3,8
1;3
3;1
3;3

Through cell-by-cell inspection, it is verified that in this game, there are two Nash Equilibria:
[TTC, TTC] and [STW, STW], and that in the second round, a Nash Equilibrium will be played,
although it is not known which, as it would depend on what was played in the first round. The
companies can make the following agreement: if in the first round, the result obtained is [VCC;
VCC], in the second round, they will play [STW; STW]. If in the first round, the result was not
[VCC; VCC], in the second round, they will play [TTC; TTC].
This might be a way to achieve a result of cooperation in the case characterized by [VCC; VCC],
where both of the companies will win more than in any of the do not cooperate strategies of a
static game, at least in the first round of the repeated game since it is known that in the last round,
this will not be possible. The payoffs viewed by the players in the opening game must be defined
according to the results that were obtained in the second round.
As the possibility of renegotiation after the first round is not being considered, the game that the
players see at the time of starting, according to the agreement, is a static game, as shown in Figure
70, plus the payoffs that they will have in the second round. Accordingly, the payoffs (2.5; 2.5)
are added up in all of the cells, except for the cell (VCC; VCC), where it must be added at (3, 3).
The game viewed by the broadcasters in the first round must be represented according to Figure
71.
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Figure 71. The Snow Games Company & The Ice Games Company: Second Round

SNOW GAMES

TTC
VCC
STW

TTC
5;5
3,6;5
4,5;4,5

ICE GAMES
VCC
6,5;3
6,8;6,8
5,5;3,5

STW
4,5;4,5
3,5;5,5
5,5;5,5

In the game that is visualized in the first round, there are three Nash Equilibria. All of them are
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) when considering the complete game in its two stages.
One of the stages confers higher payoffs for both players, which was not an NE of the game that
was played only once, as the result was [VCC; VCC]. These results were obtained due to the
existence of more than one Nash Equilibrium in the game, and on the condition that was imposed
before the game that it would not be possible to renegotiate after the first round. Even if the
possibility of renegotiation existed, it would not be possible to have the cooperation result that was
described above. This is clear, if renegotiation was possible, then the companies would come
together to play the NE, hence generating the highest payoff for both of them, before the new
season started.
The interesting fact in this example is that the betrayed company can punish the other company,
by throwing an NE that is worse for both of them in the second round [TTC; TTC], going against
itself. A renegotiation would leave no room for such a possibility. It was possible to find promises
that would induce cooperation in the early rounds of the game that were not vulnerable to
renegotiations.
Anyway, if it was possible to renegotiate, there would be no point in cooperating in the first round,
and then the result of this one must also be an NE in the game, not repeating itself. In this example,
this would correspond to simply adding to the payoffs of the first round, with the payoffs of the
result of the game’s second round [3; 3]. Because of that, the remaining SPNE would only be
[TTC; TTC], or [STW; STW] in the first round, and [STW; STW] in the second round.
5.5. Infinite Repeated Games
Traditional companies compete for many years, sometimes repeating the same strategy in similar
situations. As a result, both multinational and small companies end up getting used to the actions
of their competitors and react promptly to them.
For example, for how long have some companies that tour the beautiful Phuket Island in Thailand
competed for the preference of tourists? The various owners know that the conquest of new
customers is daily, and will happen countless times (and maybe it will never end). So, is it possible
for there to be some degree of cooperation between them? This situation characterizes ‘infinite
replay games’. The players involved are unsure when the game would end, although they do know
the results that were obtained in the previous stages. In these types of games, finding a perfect
Nash Equilibrium in a subgame that was not an NE in any of the game stages, which are considered
in isolation, would be possible.
As it is not known for sure, what the number of stages or interactions between the players will be,
the payoffs can no longer be considered the sum of the payoffs that were obtained at each stage
since the payoff then would be an infinite number.
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Another issue that is related to the payoffs is that the value to be obtained only in the thirtieth
interaction, for example, has a different value for the player, if he/she had received it in the first
round (even with the necessary adjustments in terms of updating). This means that at least for most
players, the present is more important than the future, and this assumption must be considered
when solving ‘infinitely repeated games’. In the games with this feature, it is necessary to apply
the knowledge of the discount rate and the discount factor, as will be seen below.
5.5.1 Rate and Discount Factor
For the calculation of the payoffs to be obtained by the players, a discount rate of r will be used.
This rate is directly proportional to the period considered, plus the greater the distance between
the current date and the future date, and the greater the discount rate.
Suppose that the player would want to determine a payoff of 480,000 Euros to be received ten
years on from now. Then, with a discount rate (r) of 0.5, for example, it would mean that today,
the player would receive 320,000 Euros, the so-called present value. The equation to obtain this
calculation is PV = FV/ 1+ r, where VP is the current value, and FV is the future value.
Due to this calculation, a player’s payoff in an ‘infinitely repeated game’ will be the sum of what
would be won at each stage but with these values discounted for the present. This means that it is
necessary to determine what a specific payoff is worth to a player today, which he/she would only
receive in a subsequent period. The discount rate is just one way to arrive at a more used indicator:
the discount factor, represented by the Greek letter d, with d Î (0, 1). Its association with the
discount rate can be seen in the equation.

1
d = 1+ r
…so that the higher the discount rate ( r ), the smaller will be the discount factor (d).
If the discount rate is too large (meaning a considerable amount of time between the current and
the future dates), the discount factor will be close to zero. In this case, the payoffs to be received
by the players are not very desired, and the important thing is the gift. On the other hand, a discount
factor very close to 1, for example, corresponds to the case in which the future payoffs are worth
almost the same as the present one; that is to say, the future is highly valued. Finally, the greater
the discount factor, the more valued is the future (the limit of this valuation would happen if the
discount rate was zero).
Another important consideration is that the discount factor is related to the game’s probability of
finishing in the next period. In each period, there is a probability of less than 1 of finishing the
game. This statement is correct because a small discount factor (meaning that the discount rate is
significant and that the period is long) implies that the player undervalues the future. The
probability of the game being over is greater because in extended periods, many factors can
happen, as one of the companies or both might close, give up the competition, or merge. If the
individual player valued the present and the future equally, he/she would prefer a payoff at the
current stage of the game, with this same value in the next period since there is a certain probability
that such a stage will not occur.
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In the following practical applications, it will be possible to notice that if the discount factor is
small (and the future is not so valued), the possibility of betrayal by one of the players involved is
greater. Inevitably, it can be concluded that the discount factor indicates the valuation of the future
payoffs concerning the present payoffs, and the probability that the game will end, without
reaching the next stage.
Some strategies that can induce cooperation in ‘infinitely repeated games’ will be discussed next.
Any type of association would not be possible in ‘finite repeated games’ because the players all
know when the game would end, and there would be no incentive to cooperate. As in ‘infinite
repeated games’, there is at least a certainty that no last stage would be played. Although
cooperation would be possible through the so-called ‘contingent strategies’.
5.5.2. Contingent Strategies
In ‘infinite replayed games’, the players can try to establish some mode of cooperation. When
there is a continuous interaction between them, it is then possible to use strategies that depend on
the behavior that was presented in the previous rounds. Implemented strategies are defined based
on what happened in the past interactions, and they are called ‘contingent strategies’.
The most common ‘contingent strategy’ that is used in ‘infinite replayed games’ is called the
trigger strategy or the firing strategy. Such strategies cause the player to use a cooperative position
with the other players, only while the others also cooperate. If by chance, one of them breaks the
agreement, the other player fires or establishes a penalty period, with or without a specific duration,
and does not cooperate.
Among the trigger strategies, the most that are applied are the tit-for-tat strategies (a strategy in
which you pay in the same currency) and the so-called sinister strategies. The tit-for-tat strategies
are not as full of hurts as the sinister strategies, as there is the possibility of not punishing the other
player definitively, that is, until the end of the game. Adopting these strategies would mean that
one player cooperates with the other if he/she has cooperated in the game’s last round, and not so
if the other has not cooperated in the last round.
On the other hand, sinister strategies guarantee cooperation with the other player, until the moment
he/she ceases to cooperate because from then on, he/she punishes the other player until the end of
the game. This is why the players who use these strategies do not have a short memory. Even after
many rounds, the player who lost for having cooperated does not forget what the other player did
(did not cooperate).
The concept of the perfect Nash equilibrium in subgames (SPNE) is used to make predictions
about the possible outcomes of ‘infinitely repeated games’. In this case, there will be an infinite
number of (identical) subgames, each time a new stage starts. This demonstrates a result that the
NE in the game will also be an NE in all of the other subgames, and therefore, it is an SPNE. The
Entrepreneurs’ dilemma will be used again to illustrate a situation that represents an ‘infinitely
repeated game’.
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5.6. Practical Application: The Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma
The endlessly repeated Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma means that the players know they will be brought
to justice for an unknown number of times because they understand it is possible to obtain greater
gains if they form a cartel. Taking that into account, the player’s payoffs are the present value of
the payoffs that were obtained in each game, and d is the discount factor between the two
consecutive periods.
A contingent strategy must be adopted, to try to secure the cooperation. For this, a so-called sinister
strategy will be established: a) cooperate (not confess) in the first round; b) in any subsequent
round, cooperate if the result of the previous round was (do not confess, do not confess), that is if
any cooperation occurred. Otherwise, the player no longer cooperates, and everyone confesses
after that. This game can be represented as shown in Chapter 2. If both the entrepreneurs adopt the
above strategy, the chances of cooperation are significant. Moreover, the fact that they started
cooperating in the first round will serve as a demo effect for the first round, as they will know what
happened in the previous rounds, and will cooperate again, and so on.
If that was enough to guarantee cooperation, then why do cartels face internal problems, resulting
in their disintegration? If one of the players decides to not cooperate in some game round, he/she
will obtain advantages. For effective cooperation, all of the players involved must have incentives
to use the combined contingent strategy. It is clear then, that for this strategy to constitute an SPNE,
it must be proven against any deviations by the players. That being the case, it will need to be
adequately tested, verifying the possibility that the contingent strategy is an NE in the game.
Suppose that an entrepreneur goes astray in the first round. He/she will have a differentiated payoff
but only in this round (0 instead of –1). As the other entrepreneur will know about this attitude,
he/she will never cooperate again (a sinister strategy). As a direct consequence, the result after the
first stage will always be for them both to confess. The payoff that is obtained by the deviating
entrepreneur will be the present value of his/her payoffs that were won in each round of the game,
that is:
¥

0 + (- 3)d + (- 3)d 2 + ... = (- 3)å d = =(- 3)
i =1

d
1-d

It will only be possible to know if the deviation that was made by one of the entrepreneurs had
paid off (since he/she will receive less from now on) if he/she compares what he/she would earn
in total, with the payoff he/she would have obtained if he/she had not deviated. It follows that
when both of them cooperate, the payoff obtained by each is -1. The present value of the total flow
of payoffs would then be:
¥

- 1 + (- 1)d + (- 1)d 2 + ... = (- 1) å d = = (- 1)
i =0

1
1- d
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When comparing (2) and (3), it would appear that it would only be worth deviating if:

(- 3)

d
1- d

> (- 1)

1
1
Û 1 > 3d Û d <
1- d
3

For values lower than 1/3, it is worthwhile for the entrepreneurs to deviate, meaning that by earning
less in the future, it would not affect them so much, with them preferring to achieve a higher payoff
in the first period. On the other hand, if the discount factor is not less than 1/3, the entrepreneur
would prefer to use the initially proposed contingent strategy since the other will also use it. As
the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma is symmetric, the same condition that was obtained for one
entrepreneur also applies to the other. If the d factor is greater than or equal to 1/3, none of them
will have an incentive to deviate in the first stage when the sinister strategy is proposed.
Final Considerations
The contingent strategy proposed for the two entrepreneurs will be SPNE, even if the discount
factor is greater than 1/3. Having a large discount factor in ‘infinitely repeated games’ can imply
that the results would not be achieved in non-repeated or finite repeated games, generating payoffs
higher than what could be obtained otherwise.
This reasoning can lead to a result that works for all cases, which is known as Friedman’s theorem,
or as it is usually called Folk Theorem, and not just for the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma. This theorem
assumes a static, finite, and complete information game. If there is a set of players’ strategies that
would result in payoffs for all of them, which are superior to those in the game, they could be
obtained by playing an NE game, with a discount factor very close to one. There will then be an
SPNE in this game, repeated infinitely, reaching each stage, with superior payoffs.
When studying ‘infinite repeat games’, the assumption was made that there was only one known
discount factor for each game. In business reality, there must be a discount factor for each game,
and a different discount factor for each businessman/player, which means that the future has
different values for each one of them. Although it does not change the game’s resolution, the
discount factor will need to be calculated individually.
Summary
In ‘finite repeated games’, all of the players involved know in advance, how many times that game
will repeat itself, and based on this information, they decide their strategies. In ‘infinite repeated
games’, the players do not know when the last stage will be, for instance, when the game ends.
The intrinsic idea for repeated games is the possibility of cooperation between the players to
cooperate in the subsequent stages. Irrespective, such collaboration is unlikely. Realize that once
it is known that the last stage of the game has been reached, nobody else will cooperate, as it will
no longer be necessary for the other to cooperate in the future, as this last stage will never be
reached. In the case of ‘infinite repeated games’, it was seen that it would be possible to find an
SPNE that was not an NE in any of the game’s stages when taken separately. Regarding the payoff,
it was assumed that the individuals valued the present more than the future and that this would be
the sum of what each player would earn at each stage, with these values discounted for the present
through a discount factor: the closer to 1, the future payoffs are valuable.
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To guarantee cooperation in ‘infinitely repeated games’, it is common to use ‘contingent
strategies’, which determine the future actions based on the players’ past behavior. The best-known
contingent strategies are the trigger strategies, among which, the tit-for-tat and the sinister
strategies stand out. In replayed games, the key concept for making predictions about the possible
game’s outcomes is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which must be an NE in all
of the other subgames (as they are all identical), and therefore, it is an SPNE. Friedman’s theorem
established a general rule: if there is a set of strategies that would result in payoffs for all of them
that were superior to those that would be obtained by playing an NE game, with a discount factor
that is sufficiently close to one, then there will be an SPNE in this game repeated infinitely, where
such superior payoffs are achieved at each stage.
Questions
1. Define finite repeated games and point out how to solve them.
1. Explain what an infinite replayed game is.
2. How important are the discount rate and the discount factor in determining the outcome of
a ‘finite repeated game’?
3. Conceptualize contingent strategies and trigger strategies.
4. Answer if it is true or false and justify the answer:
A) In infinite replayed games, it is possible to obtain cooperation if there is a strategy
that is contingent on all of the players.
B) When a game with only one NE is repeated a finite number of times, it is easier to
get the cooperation repeated three times or more, not just twice.
Practical Application: Two Travel Agencies in Varna (Bulgaria)
Two travel agencies in Varna (Bulgaria) - Star Travel and Mozartravel, both travel specialists for
performances in classical music musicals, have serious financial problems (Figure 72).
Figure 72. Varna

According to industry analysts, the companies need to make new investments in technology to
regain their competitiveness, by adapting to the sector’s new reality. As such investments are not
possible in the short and medium-term, another suggestion would be to merge with another
company (MER) in the sector. In this case, both companies will gain $2 million each, due to the
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operation’s synergy. If one of the companies decides to not merge with the other company (NOM),
and the other chooses to merge, the first earns $4 million and the last loses $2 million. If the two
decide not to merge and try to recover by promoting internal measures, they both will win. If the
two companies choose to merge with other companies in the sector, then both of the companies
would be harmed, at least in the short term. Suppose that the game is repeated, so that it is played
twice. The strategies and the payoffs can be verified in a Normal or Representative form, as shown
in Figure 73. Find and comment on the game’s outcome.
Figure 73. Normal or Representative Form
MER
NOM

STAN TRAVEL

MOZART TRAVEL
MER
NOM
2;2
4;-2
-2;4
3;3

Practical Application: Two Museums That Are Located in Rome (Italy)
Two museums that are located in Rome (Italy) - GoldCoin and LatinBill - are highly visited by
tourists, due to their outstanding bill and coins collection (Figure 74).
Figure 74. Rome

In institutional auctions, both museums tend to compete for the same collectors’ bill and coins
collection, which causes the prices to rise so that they both end up paying a higher amount than
they would pay without any competition. The ideal from the point of view of the museums would
be that they alternate bids at the auctions (ABA), lot by lot. If this understanding was mutual, they
would both win. Alternatively, if the other company does not agree (NBA), they will enter a price
war and they will no longer trust each other, making their cooperation very unlikely. Suppose that
the game will be repeated infinitely, meaning that both the GoldCoin and LatinBill museums do
not know how long there will be auctions of notes and coins. Is there a ‘contingent strategy’ in this
game? Which one? Find the game’s result. What if the discount factor is 0.4? The strategies and
the payoffs are represented in Figure 75.
Figure 75. Normal or Representative Form
GOLD COIN

ABA
NBA

LATIN BILL
ABA
NBA
3;3
0;4
4;0
1;1
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Chapter 6: Model for the Application of
Game Theory to Business Reality
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Chapter 6: Model for the Application of Game Theory to Business
Reality
Key Terms
•
•
•

Definition of the Question
Identification of Critical Factors
Construction of the Model

When considering that there is a wide variety of types of games and that the system that involves
them is also quite diversified, it is interesting to have a script that allows for a panoramic view of
the context of a given situation. This, by the way, is a recurring demand from students in courses
where Game Theory is taught.
The model that is proposed and described below is composed of three steps and ten steps. It should
be emphasized that this is a generic model. Each situation requires analysis and different
approaches. The model can and should be adopted because of the circumstances. The main points
to consider are:
• Definition of the Problem to Be Faced. The player must have a clear idea of what kind
of problem must be solved, or what goal must be achieved.
• Identification of the Critical Factors. There must be a detailed analysis of the situation,
describing the main characteristics of the problem that involves the players. Each player’s
actions and the information level of the game (perfect or imperfect information) are then
established. Finally, the payoffs to be obtained by the players are quantified.
• Construction of the Game Representation Model. This is the stage in which the
situation experienced by the player is put on the board, that is to say, transformed into a
game and ready to be played. At this step, the kind of game must be defined and how it
should be resolved.
6.1. Roadmap for the Three-Step and 10-Step Model
6.1.1. First Step: The Question’s Definition
Step 1. Identify if the company has specific goals to achieve or issues that need to be addressed.
For example, successive drops in sales volume (problem), or reaching the first position in market
share in the segment in which it operates (goal).
Step 2. Once the question has been defined, check whether the situation involves other players.
For instance, suppose that the problem is a drop in the company’s revenue (admittedly in this
model, in the future). In that case, this may result from the dissatisfaction or non-engagement of
the employees linked to the commercial area, such as attendants or representatives. As such, the
players are the company, on the one hand, and the employees, on the other.
6.1.2. Second Step: Identification of the Critical Factors
Step 3. Once the issue has been identified and who the players are, list all of the company
characteristics that are related to sales. For illustration, the salary and commission policy, the credit
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system, the product delivery (logistics), the pricing policy, the organizational climate, the
hierarchy, the professional development, the benefits system, and everything else related to the
employees.
Step 4. Check if there is any sector of the company that is directly involved in the problem. In this
case, it could be the Human Resources Department.
Step 5. Establish what actions (based on each player’s characteristics) this department should take
to resolve the issue. For example, should the company choose between increasing the
commissions, expanding the benefits, or relocating the current employees to other sectors?
Step 6. Once you have defined the issue and who the players are and their possible actions, check
that the players involved are aware of each other’s actions. Establish whether the players should
act simultaneously (static game), or whether one will wait for the other to act (dynamic game).
Step 7. Based on the company and employee strategies, determine the results and quantify the
payoffs involved in the game at each strategy clash. To be specific, the payoffs that are linked to
the billing variable can rise or fall. This value can perhaps be defined based on the expectations of
the company’s directors.
6.1.3. Third Step: Model Building and Resolution
Step 8. If in step 6 it was defined that the strategies will be implemented simultaneously
(represented in a Normal form), establish if the situation in question will occur only once, if it will
be repeated finitely (annually, for five years), or whether it will be repeated infinitely (annually,
without termination). However, if in step 6, it was defined that the strategies will be implemented
in a dynamic form (represented in an extensive form), establish if the situation at some point will
have one or more players, acting without knowing precisely what action the other party will play
(imperfect information), or whether each player when acting, will know what the other player did
in the previous move (perfect information).
Step 9. If the game is simultaneous, establish the Nash Equilibrium, even with mixed strategies
(use of all of the probabilities). If it is dynamic, solve it by ‘retroactive induction’ (back to front).
If it is finite repeated, resolve it in the same way as a static game but played as many times as was
previously determined. If it is repeated endlessly and it is of the Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma type,
check if a ‘contingent strategy’ will be announced to the players, for them to consider the
possibility of cooperation during the game. For instance, if they have struggled and the sales
increase in the first year, the company can extend the benefits into the second year.
Step 10. Establish the best strategies for both of the players based on the payoffs obtained. To
suggest an idea, it is maybe best for the company to increase the commissions for the employees,
so they can be motivated to continue with the same level of effort.
6.2. Model Application: Practical Case
Suppose that you are one of the directors of a construction company named Building Dreams Corp.
(BDC) which is located in Amsterdam, and specializes in tourist equipment. The Company meets
the requirements that were established in a bidding notice, as prepared by the Dutch government,
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for the renovation of a touristic waterfront in the city center.
6.2.1. First Step: Define the Question
•
•

BDC’s objective is to win the public competition.
BDC may have competition from the Steel Boats Corp. (SBC), which also meets the
requirements, as set out in the notice.

6.2.2. Second Step: The Identification of the Critical Factors
•

•
•

•

•

BDC is the market leader but it faces difficulties regarding its personnel policy, such as a
high employee turnover, which considerably increases its costs. SBC has recently entered
the market and does not have an extensive portfolio yet but it dominates modern highway
management and paving maintenance technologies.
To achieve its objective, BDC needs to offer not only a (competitive) market price but
also the best proposal in terms of shoreline renovation.
As a result, BDC needs accurate calculations of the cost sector that was carried out by the
engineering department. Initially, it has three possible actions to be implemented:
compete by establishing a market price, formulate an innovative program to renew the
edge (a little more expensive), or an action that includes the first two.
SBC needs to decide whether to enter the bidding process. In the meantime, during the
proposal preparation phase, BDC may or may not modify the action that was initially
chosen, depending on whether SBC enters the market. In this case, BDC could maintain
or increase the original proposal.
The possible payoffs for BDC are a) winning the bid notice, with a more profitable bid,
or b) winning with a less profitable offer (which would be caused by the belief that SBC
would compete in the bid, forcing it to enter with the market price for the work). The
payoffs for SBC are a) causing a slight loss, or b) causing a significant loss in the
competitor’s profitability. The payoffs represent the percentage of profitability of the
companies and they were obtained based on the billing and profit estimates made by the
directors and the other company’s administrators at the beginning of the work.

6.2.3. Third Step: Model Building and Resolution
•

•

•

The situation is characterized as a dynamic game of ‘complete and imperfect
information’ (Figure 39). As previously mentioned, BDC must decide during the
proposal elaboration phase, whether it can modify the initially chosen action, depending
on the entry or not of SBC, by maintaining or increasing the initial proposal.
As the game is a game of dynamic of ‘complete and imperfect information’, the static
part is first resolved by identifying the subgames, and finding the Nash Equilibrium of
each one of them, if any. Then replace them with the remaining set and resolve by
‘retroactive induction’ (back to front).
Find the game’s result.
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Summary
This chapter has presented a model that makes it possible to apply Game Theory in different
situations in the business world. Even so, this model does not rule out any possible change in its
format that may be necessary for each company’s particular circumstances. Instead, this model is
just an attempt to systematize the assessment of a given scenario, and facilitate the choice of
strategies that should be adopted.
Questions
1. Comment on each step of the proposed model for the practical application of Game
Theory.
2. Apply the model in Figure 40 to two cases of companies of your choice.
Practical Application: Tours in Seoul
The two situations described below show companies facing specific problems, or seeking to
achieve their goals. Based on the proposed model, build a Game Theory application spreadsheet
concerning the reality for each one of them.
The Salty Air Company offers tours in Seoul (Figure 76) and it intends to be the market leader in
the Korean capital. It has some comparative advantages, such as agreements with large hotels, and
an internal structure that implies reduced operating costs. The Shadow & Fresh Water Company,
the market leader in the capital, does not want to lose its position and would react to any Salty Air
strategy. It is noteworthy that the market leader does not have its image related to low prices; its
reputation is for offering unforgettable tours.
Figure 76. Seoul.

The Let Me Show You Company! provides tourist guides in Prague (Czech Republic) – Figure 77.
It depends a lot on the empathy and knowledge of its professionals, and the constant improvement
of its team must be part of its routine. The Company intends to invest in the qualification of its
guides, by sending them to a conference on receptive tourism. However, the directors of the Let
Me Show You Company! are afraid that after the training, the employees will ask for a salary
increase, and if not met, they will migrate to one of their competitors.
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Figure 77. Prague.
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Chapter 7: Glossary
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Chapter 7: Glossary
Action
Action is an attitude, such as cooperating or not with your opponent, making agreements, or
warring, reacting, or accommodating to a threat.
Prisoners’ Dilemma
The Prisoners’ Dilemma example is often used in Game Theory. This example shows, among
other things, that individual rationality can lead to an irrational result in collective terms. In this
book, the Prisoners’ Dilemma has been adapted to the business world and called the
Entrepreneurs’ Dilemma.
Operational Efficiency
Operational efficiency is a condition that does not require an act of choice but questions that part
of common sense. This concept is related to short-term results.
Iterated Elimination of the Strictly Dominated Strategies
The iterated elimination of the strictly dominated strategies is a process by which the strictly
dominated strategies are sequentially eliminated since if the player is rational, he/she should not
play them.
Iterated Elimination of Strategies That Are Never the Best Answer
The iterated elimination of strategies is a process by which the strategies, for whatever strategy
the players adopt, are never the best answers. While not necessarily strictly mastered, these
strategies are not chosen at any point in the game.
Nash Equilibrium (NE)
In a simultaneous game, the strategies that constitute a Nash Equilibrium are important for every
player, if these strategies are a better response to the specified strategies of the other players.
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
The SPNE is a set of strategies in a dynamic game that induces a Nash Equilibrium in each of the
subgames of that game.
Strategy
Strategy is a complete contingent plan (or a decision rule) that specifies how the player will act
in all possible circumstances that he/she may face.
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Strictly Dominated Strategies
Strictly dominated strategies are a strategy that is strictly dominated if, for every combination of
the other players’ strategies, the payoff achieved when adopting that strategy is strictly lower
than that of any other.
Strictly Dominant Strategies
Strictly dominant strategies are where one strategy is dominant over another when the results
obtained by using it are always better than the results that were obtained with another strategy (to
generate the highest possible payoff for you), regardless of the strategy chosen by the other
players.
Mixed Strategies
Mixed strategies are a distribution of probabilities about some or even all of the possible
strategies to be implemented. The balance to be achieved is a pair of probabilities.
Rationalizable Strategies
Rationalizable strategies are the strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strategies that
are never the best answer.
Sequentially Rational Strategies
Sequentially rational strategies are those that do not involve threats that represent a bluff.
Discount Factor
The discount factor indicates the valuation of the present in relation to the future by the players
involved; it is between zero and 1. The closer to 1, the more the future is valued over the present.
Extensive Form
An extensive form is a way in which dynamic games of complete information are represented,
regardless of having perfect or imperfect information. The design is in the shape of a tree.
Normal or Strategic Form
The Normal or Strategic form is a way in which static games of complete information, finite, and
infinite repeated games, are represented. The design is in the form of a matrix.
Complete Information
Complete information is the situation in which each of the players involved in the dispute knows
the payoffs to be obtained by all of the other players.
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Incomplete information
Incomplete information occurs when the payoffs for each player, depending on their strategies,
are not common knowledge.
Imperfect Information
Imperfect information is when the players do not know exactly what their opponent’s chosen
strategy was at some point in the game.
Perfect Information
Perfect information is when all of the players know which decision node they are in, as they
know all of their opponent’s previous moves.
Players
In business terms, the players are the economic agents that make the decisions, and they may be
represented by consumers seeking to maximize their satisfaction, companies seeking to
maximize their profits or increase their market share, with investors deciding to take out a loan
or not. The players are, in principle, considered rational (they choose their actions to obtain the
greatest advantage for themselves) and they have preferences regarding the game’s outcomes.
Game
Game is a formal representation of a situation in which a certain number of individuals interact
in a scenario of strategic interdependence. The result of each player’s actions will also depend on
the actions of the other players involved.
Static Games
Static games are games in which, at the moment that one player is making his/her choice, the
other player is not sure what that choice will be. They are also known as simultaneous games.
Evolutionary Games
Evolutionary games postulate that the players have limited knowledge of their environment,
limited resources, together with only a modest reasoning ability (as opposed to unlimited
rationality), and unequal degrees of knowledge.
Finite Repeated Games
Finite repeated games feature the type of a game in which all of the players involved know, in
advance, how many times that game will be repeated, and based on this information, they decide
their strategies.
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Infinite Repeated Games
Infinite repeated games are games where all of the players involved do not know for sure when
the game will end, which does not mean that they will be played endlessly. For Simultaneous
Games see Static Games.
John Nash F. Jr.
John Nash F. Jr. proved the existence of an equilibrium strategy for all of the games with n
players, which came to be known as the Nash Equilibrium.
John von Neumann
John von Neumann was a Doctor in Mathematics. He is considered the father of Game Theory,
having contributed to the advances in logic, quantum mechanics, mathematics, computing, and
economics.
Nature
Nature is when in a game, there may only be one player. In this case, it is said that it is a game
against Nature, which is characterized as a special player, as it has neither interests nor
intentions. It is about chance.
Rules
Rules describe the reality and delimit the actions that can be taken by the players.
Payoffs
The payoffs are the possible gains to be conquered. They are established from the results that are
obtained by the actions of the players, and they can be represented by new customers conquered,
increased sales volume or market share, reduced costs, profits, better levels of customer
satisfaction, or any other value.
Perfect Recall
Perfect recall, also called perfect memory, is the ability that allows the players to not forget their
previous moves or the information that they held at a certain point in the game, even if it is
prolonged.
Focal Points
Focal points are factors, such as cultural issues, customs, and the traditions of communities, or
groups of people that can facilitate the identification of a Nash Equilibrium.
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Results
Results are the set of strategies of each player that were put into practice during the game,
leading to certain results, which can be expressed by the payoffs. The results are the consequence
of the players’ actions.
Subgame
A subgame is a set of decision nodes and branches that descend solely from one node. A
subgame is a subset of a game.
Zermelo’s Theorem
Every finite game of perfect information has a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies that can be
achieved by retroactive induction. If no player has equal payoffs at the different endpoints, then
there is only one NE that can be derived in that way.
Game Theory
Game Theory is the science of strategic thinking that proposes to analyze problems, in which
there is an interaction between agents, where the decisions of an individual, company, or
government, affect and are affected by the decisions of the other agents or players.

– END –
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